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INTRODUCTION
For sports fans, August 12, 1994, will be infamously
remembered as the day when all 1120 members of the Major
League Baseball Players' Association' ("Players' Association" or
"Players") went on strike,2 launching what became the longest
work stoppage in the history of professional sports.' One month
later, on September 14, the owners of the twenty-eight Major
League Baseball teams ("Owners") cancelled the World Series4
for the first time since 1904.5 Furthermore, as a result of the
strike, the Players have forfeited approximately US$230 million
in income,6 while the Owners have endured losses approaching
US$600 million.7 Thus, the Major League Baseball (or "MLB")
labor dispute has generated more than US$800 million in losses,
without accounting for the financial damage levied upon inter-
ested third parties, such as the local communities that depend
* J.D. Candidate, 1996, Fordham University.
1. See Paul Waldie, Scabs Set To Play Ball Next Year: Leal Eagles Say Owners Can Field
Scabs in the Majors in '95 Season. Except in Toronto, Where Jays Are Protected by Ontario Labor
Law, FIN. POST, Dec. 1, 1994, § 1, at 10. There are twenty-eight teams in Major League
Baseball, each with forty players on its official roster. Id. The Major League Baseball
Players' Association is the union that represents Major League Baseball players. Frank
Swoboda, Labor of Glove; Baseball Players' Bargaining Clout Offers Clues to a Union Revival,
WASH. PoST, July 24, 1994, at HI [hereinafter Labor of Glove].
2. Baseball '94: Going, Going... Gone, LA TIMES, Sept. 15, 1994, at C7.
3. See id. The Players' Association ended the strike on March 31, 1995. Murray
Chass, Backed by Court, Baseball Players Call Strike Over, N.Y. TIMES, Apr. 1, 1995, § 1, at 1;
see Murray Chass, Labor Board To Seek Injunction Against Baseball Club Owners, N.Y. TIMES,
Mar. 27, 1995, at Al (hereinafter Labor Board To Seek Injunction] (discussing status of
strike).
4. See AMERcIAN HERITAGE DicrIoNARY 1391 (2d college ed. 1982). The World Se-
ries is defined as the series of professional baseball games played each fall between the
championship teams of the American League and the National League. Id.
5. Baseball '94: Going, Going... Gone, supra note 2, at C7.
6. Mark Maske, Baseball's Waiting Game: Now Both Sides Cool off, Action Shifts to
Camps, Hearings on Hill, WASH. POST, Feb. 12, 1995, at DI [hereinafter Baseball's Waiting
Game].
7. Id.
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upon MLB for revenue and employment.8
Determined to reopen for business, the Owners collectively
decided to hire replacement workers to play for their teams
until the strike settled.9 In mid-January 1995, the Major League
Baseball Executive Council1° approved the hiring of tempor-
ary replacement players." Under U.S. labor law, the Owners
were legally entitled to hire workers to replace the' Players,
who were engaged in an economic strike, 2 involving such
issues as a Payroll Tax,"3 Salary Arbitration,' 4 and Revenue
8. See Bob Chick, Baseball Strike Has her Jobless and Frustrated, TAMPA TPuB., Mar. 4,
1995, at 1 (discussing financial affects of strike on stadium vendors and support staff);
Claire Smith, Chilly Season for Spring Training Towns, N.Y. TiMES, Mar. 23, 1995, at B19
(explaining impact of strike on cities dependent upon MLB for revenue). The city of
Winter Haven, Florida, is expected to lose more than US$250,000 because of the strike.
Id.
9. Murray Chass, Who Are Those Guys? Veil of Secrecy to Be Lifted Soon, N.Y. TIMES,
Feb. 12, 1995, § 8, at 1 [hereinafter Who Are Those Guys?].
10. Murray Chass, Steinbrenner Gets a Seat on Owners'Ruling Unit, N.Y. TIMES, Mar. 9,
1995, at B19. The Major League Baseball Executive Council operates Major League
Baseball in the absence of a League commissioner. Id. The Council makes decisions
regarding the day-to-day workings of MLB. Id. Currently, there is no Commissioner of
MLB. Id. Bud Selig of the Milwaukee Brewers is Chairman of the eight-member Coun-
cil, and consequently is functioning as the acting Commissioner. Id.
11. UK: Baseball-Blue Jays Coaches Spared From Replacement Worries, Textiine-Reuter
Sports, Jan. 19, 1995, available in LEXIS, Nexis Library, Curnews File. Temporary re-
placement workers fill the jobs of striking workers until the strike is over. George S.
Roukis & Mamdouh I. Farid, An Alternative Approach to the Permanent Striker Replacement
Strategy, 44 LAB. L.J. 80, 81-82 (1993).
12. NLRB v. Mackay Radio & Telegraph Co., 304 U.S. 333, 345 (1938). Employers
who are the target of an economic strike, and who have not committed any acts prohib-
ited by the National Labor Relations Act, may hire permanent replacement workers. Id.
The U.S. Supreme Court distinguished between situations where employees strike be-
cause of an employer's Unfair Labor Practice under Section 8(a) of the National Labor
Relations Act, 29 U.S.C. § 159 (1988), and where employees strike because of economic
issues and the employer is "guilty of no act denounced by the statute." Id.; NLRB v.
Curtin Matheson Scientific, Inc., 494 U.S. 775, 790 (1989).
13. Baseball's Waiting Game, supra note 6, at Dl. The Owners' recently proposed
that a 75% tax be levied on all money teams devote to player compensation above a
threshold of US$35 million. Id. The Owners also want a 100% tax on all money paid to
players in excess of US$42 million. Id. The Players' Association propose that only cer-
tain teams, under a revenue-sharing plan, pay a tax on their payroll. Id. The Players'
plan calls for a five percent tax on all money clubs devote to player compensation in
excess of 50% of the average major league payroll in a given year. Id. Furthermore, the
Players want a ceiling of a 25% tax on all player compensation exceeding 160% of the
average payroll. Id.
14. Id. The Owners want to eliminate salary arbitration. Id. The Players are will-
ing to eliminate or modify arbitration, in exchange for other forms of compensation,
such as increased free agency rights. Id.
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Sharing. 5
The inability of the Owners and Players to agree to a new
collective bargaining agreement (or "CBA"), 16 an agreement
that would address such economic issues,1 7 prompted the Own-
ers to escalate the labor dispute1 8 and hire temporary replace-
ment players. 9 The Owners, however, encountered an obstacle
that could have prevented them from universally implementing
their replacement player plan20  _ the Province of Ontario,
home of the Toronto Blue Jays, forbids the hiring of replace-
ment workers.2
This Note compares the doctrine of replacement workers as
it exists in Ontario, Canada, the United States, and international
law. Part I places the baseball strike in its proper historical con-
text, recapitulating past labor disputes in Major League Baseball,
as well as examining the principal areas of contention in the
present conflict. Part I also introduces the structure and work-
ings of the International Labour Organisation ("ILO") and ex-
plores the right to strike and the right to hire replacement work-
ers during a strike under international labor law. Part II dis-
cusses the right to strike and the right to hire replacement
15. Id. The Owners and Players both approved a plan adopted by the Owners in
January 1994. Id.
16. See ARCHIBALD COX ET AL., CASES AND MATERIALS ON LABOR LAw 740 (11th ed.
1991). A collective bargaining agreement is a labor contract which establishes the rela-
tionship between the employer and employees, and among the employees themselves."
Id. "The agreement is not a contract of employment; employees are hired separately
and individually, but the tenure and terms of their employment once in the [bargain-
ing] unit are regulated by the provisions in the collective bargaining agreement." Id.;
see BLACK'S LAw DIcrcoNARY 263 (6th ed. 1990). A collective bargaining agreement is
an agreement between an employer and a labor union that regulates terms and condi-
tions of employment for all members of the bargaining unit that work for that em-
ployer. Id. The former CBA expired on December 31, 1993. Baseball '94: Going, Going
... Gone, supra note 2, at C7.
17. Baseball '94: Going, Going... Gone, supra note 2, at C7.
18. 29 U.S.C. § 152(9) (1988). Section 2(9) of the NLRA defines a labor dispute
as any controversy concerning terms, tenure, or conditions of employment, or concern-
ing the association or representation of persons in negotiating, fixing, maintaining,
changing, or seeking to arrange terms or conditions of employment, regardless of
whether the disputants stand in the proximate relation of employer and employee. Id.;
NLRB v. Mackay Radio & Telegraph Co., 304 U.S. 333, 344 (1938).
19. Waldie, supra note 1, § 1, at 10.
20. Id.
21. The Labour Relations Act, R.S.O., ch. 21, § 73.1 (1992) (Can.). An employer
shall not use any person to perform the work of an employee who is on strike. Id.
§ 73.1(5).
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workers in both Ontario and the United States. Part III analyzes
the MLB strike under both Ontario and U.S. law. Part III fur-
ther argues that Ontario law infringes on employers' rights, tran-
scending the protections afforded employees by international
law, regarding the use of replacement workers, and that U.S. law,
under the Mackay Doctrine,2 unduly restricts workers' right of
freedom of association. This Note concludes that a compromise
between Ontario and U.S. law would result in a more balanced
distribution of power between labor and management, thereby
furthering the goals of the ILO, the Ontario Labor Relations Act
(or "Ontario Act"), and the U.S. National Labor Relations Act
(or "NLRA").
I. THE BASEBALL LABOR DISPUTE, THE RIGHT TO STRIKE,
AND THE RIGHT TO HIRE REPLACEMENT WORKERS UNDER
THE INTERNATIONAL LABOUR ORGANISATION
The Major League Baseball strike, involving teams in both
Ontario, Canada and the United States, illustrates two antitheti-
cal approaches to the issue of replacement workers.23 The ILO
is an Organization comprised of workers', employers', and gov-
ernment representatives from its member states, that establishes
international labor standards. 24 The ILO has addressed the is-
sue of replacement workers, articulating a policy that differs
from the practice in both Canada and the United States,25 two of
its member states. 6
A. The Major League Baseball Labor Dispute
One constant throughout the history of professional base-
ball 27 in the United States has been the controversy surrounding
22. See NLRB v. Mackay Radio & Telegraph Co., 304 U.S. 333, 345 (1938) (stating
that employer who has not committed unfair labor practice and is target of economic
strike may hire permanent replacement workers).
23. See id. (establishing right to hire permanent replacement workers); The La-
bour Relations Act, R.S.O., ch. 21, §§ 73-73.1 (1992) (Can.) (prohibiting use of replace-
ment workers).
24. N. VAL-rcos, INTERNATIONAL LABOUR LAw 20, 42 (1979).
25. Complaint Against the Government of the United States Presented by the
American Federation of Labor and Congress of Industrial Organizations (AFL-CIO),
Case No. 1543, 74 ITr'L LAB. OFF. On'L BuLL. 15, 27 (CFA 278th Rep. 1991).
26. INTERNATIONAL LABOUR OFFICE, LIST OF RATIFICATIONS BY CONVENTION AND BY
CouNTRY 229 (Dec. 31, 1993) [hereinafter IAsT OF RATIFICATIONS].
27. See Geoffrey C. Ward & Ken Bums, Game Time, U.S. NEws & WoRLD REP., Aug.
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how much team owners should compensate their players. 8 In
1881, Albert Spalding, an owner of a professional baseball team,
proclaimed that every team would face bankruptcy if players' sal-
aries were not brought under control. 9 In the late 1800's, the
highest paid player in MLB earned US$2500 a year.30 One hun-
dred and fourteen years later, MLB has developed into a US$2
billion a year industry 1 and the top player salary has risen to
US$6.3 million a year.3 2 Now, in 1995, team owners are once
again forecasting financial ruin for themselves and the sport, al-
legedly due to escalating players' salaries.3 3 The Players' Associa-
tion, however, does not subscribe to the Owners' theory of im-
pending doom, and consequently has refused to accede to the
Owners' contractual demands,34 prompting the eighth labor dis-
pute in Major League Baseball during the last twenty-three
years. 3
5
1. Labor Relations in Major League Baseball Prior to 1994
From 1972 through 1990, MLB endured seven separate
work stoppages, all intrinsically linked to the issue of player
compensation.3 6  In 1973, the Owners locked out the Play-
29, 1994, at 60 (discussing history of baseball in United States, from 1845 through
1994).
28. Mark McGuire, Baseball May Throw Fans A Curve; Another Work Stoppage Looms as
Players Are Ready To Set a Strike Date, TIMES UNION, July 28, 1994, at Al [hereinafter
Baseball May Throw Curve]; see Kevii E. Martens, Fair or Foul? The Survival of Small-Market
Teams in Major League Baseball, 4 MARQ. SPORTS L.J. 323 (1994) (discussing economic
condition of MLB).
29. Baseball May Throw Curve, supra note 28, at Al.
30. Id. Salaries rose throughout the twentieth century, with a top salary of
US$100,000 in 1947, US$125,000 in 1971, US$1,000,000 in 1980, and peaking in 1994
at US$6,300,000. Id.
31. Larry Whiteside, A Divisive Dilemma; Arbitration a Core Issue in Baseball's Labor
Dispute, BOSTON GLOBE, Aug. 16, 1994, at 51 [hereinafter A Divisive Dilemma].
32. Baseball May Throw Curve, supra note 28, at Al.
33. A Divisive Dilemma, supra note 31, at 51.
34. Id.; see Murray Chass, Economist Hired by Union Disputes Owners' Loss Claims, N.Y.
TIMES, Aug. 25, 1994, at B9 (explaining that player compensation is not causing eco-
nomic problems in baseball and that baseball is financially healthy) [hereinafter Union
Disputes Owners' Loss Claims].
35. Baseball; A Long Road to a Stalemate, N.Y. TIMEs, Sept. 15, 1994, at B12 [hereinaf-
ter Long Road to Stalemate].
36. Id. In 1972, the Players went on strike due to a dispute regarding pension and
benefit plans. Id. In 1973 the Owners locked the Players out before a settlement was
reached establishing salary arbitration. Id. The Owners again locked the Players out in
1976, after disagreeing about the implementation of free agency. Id. In 1980 and 1981,
the Players went on strike, each time because of the Owners' demands for compensa-
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ers,3 7 eventually resulting in the creation of a system of salary
arbitration.3 8 Under this system, a player whose contract had ex-
pired could present his salary demands to an arbitrator, who
would decide how much money that player would make for his
next contract.3 9  One year later, this right to arbitrate salaries
and contracts yielded Major League Baseball's first free agent. 40
Jim "Catfish" Hunter, a pitcher with the Oakland Athletics
("Athletics"), possessed a contract that obligated team owner,
Charlie 0. Finley, to pay Hunter's insurance premium.41 In
1974, after Finley failed to pay the premium, an arbitrator de-
clared Hunter a free agent, ruling that Finley had breached the
contract. 42 As a free agent, Hunter could sell his services to the
highest bidder.43 He eventually signed a multi-year contract with
the New York Yankees for a total of US$3.75 million, making
him the highest paid player in Major League Baseball. 44
Two years later, following another lockout, the Owners and
tion regarding free agents. Id. The final two labor disputes, in 1985 when the Players
went on strike, and in 1990 when the Owners locked out the Players, involved negotia-
tions over new collective bargaining agreements. Id.
37. American Shipbuilding Co. v. NLRB, 280 U.S. 300 (1965). A legal lockout
under the NLRA may occur as follows: after an impasse has been reached, whereby the
two sides have been unable to reach an agreement through good-faith bargaining, the
employer may temporarily layoff employees solely as a means of bringing economic
pressure. Id.
38. Long Road to Stalemate, supra note 35, at B12.
39. A Divisive Dilemma, supra note 31, at 51; Players Win Big with Method of Resolving
Salay Disputes, PR Newswire, Mar. 14, 1980, available in LEXIS, News Library, Arcnws
File. Under this system, both the player and the owner would submit competing offers
as to how much money the player should be paid. Id. The arbitrator would then
choose between the two offers. Id. See Frederick N. Donegan, Examining the Role of
Arbitration in Professional Baseball, 1 SPORTS L.J. 183 (1994) (discussing pros and cons of
salary arbitration in MLB). Without this arbitration system, "the parties would likely
submit inflated (the player) and deflated (the owners) salary figures in anticipation of
the arbitrator's averaging or compromising. Essentially, the salary arbitration's final
offer component actually promotes reasonable salary offers, realistic bargaining pos-
ture, and good faith settlement." Id. at 191-92. Statistics also indicate that once a
player files for salary arbitration, that player and his team mutually agree on a salary
without ever having to go to arbitration. Id. at 192. Critics of MLB's salary arbitration
system decry that it yields inflated "salaries beyond what would result in a free market."
Id. at 193.
40. Long Road to Stalemate, supra note 35, at B12; DAVID NEMEC ET AL., PLAYERS OF
CoopERsrowN - BASEBALL'S HALL OF FAME 250 (1994).
41. NEMEC ET AL., supra note 40, at 250.
42. Id.
43. Game Time, supra note 27, at 60.
44. Id.; NEMEC ET AL., supra note 40, at 250.
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Players formally agreed to a league-wide system of free agency. 45
Under the new agreement, every veteran player with more than
six years of Major League service automatically became eligible
for free agency, upon the expiration of his individual contract.'
This free agency system greatly increased demand for Players'
services, prompting bidding wars amongst the Owners and yield-
ing higher wages for the Players.47 The average MLB salary rose
from US$44,674 in 1975,48 to US$185,000 in 1980,49 to the cur-
rent high of US$1,200,000 in 1994.5o
2. Baseball's Exemption From Federal Antitrust Laws
In 1922, the U.S. Supreme Court adjudicated a labor dis-
pute between two rival professional baseball leagues, carving out
an exemption from federal antitrust laws" for baseball.5 2 The
Court held that baseball games could not be classified as com-
merce, and thus the antitrust prohibitions could not apply to
professional baseball.5 3 Thirty-one years later, the Court reaf-
firmed baseball's antitrust exemption in a law suit brought by
MLB players against the Owners. 4
In Toolson v. N.Y. Yankees, Inc.," players alleged that the
owners had established an illegal monopoly and restrained trade
by conspiring not to hire each other's players.5 6 In a one para-
graph decision, the U.S. Supreme Court ruled against the play-
45. NEMEC ET AL., supra note 40, at 242.
46. Id.
47. Larry Whiteside, Eighteen Years Later, It's a Free-for-All; Seitz'Epic Ruling Has Set the
Stage for Confrontation, BOSTON GLOBE, Sept. 22, 1994, at 71.
48. Richard Justice, Baseball's Owners Reject New Offer; Players Could Set Strike Date
Today, WASH. PosT, July 28, 1994, at D1 [hereinafter Owners Reject New Offer].
49. NEMEC ET AL., supra note 40, at 242.
50. Swoboda, Labor of Glove, supra note 1, at Hi.
51. Sherman Act, 26 Stat. 209 (1890), as amended, 15 U.S.C. §§ 1-8 (Supp. II.
1990). The Act prohibits the following: every contract, action, or attempt to restrain
trade or commerce that may be regulated by Congress; any attempt to monopolize, or
the actual monopolizing of any part of trade or commerce that may be covered by the
U.S. Congress' commerce powers. Id. §§ 1-3.
52. Federal Base Ball Club of Baltimore, Inc. v. Nat'l League of Professional Base
Ball Clubs, 259 U.S. 200 (1922).
53. Id. at 209. The Court reasoned that exhibitions of baseball were primarily in-
trastate affairs and that interstate travel amongst the teams was incidental to the exhibi-
tions. Id.
54. Toolson v. N.Y. Yankees, Inc., 346 U.S. 356 (1953) (Burton & Reed, JJ., dissent-
ing).
55. 346 U.S. 356 (1953).
56. Id. at 362-64. All players' contracts contained what was known as a "Reserve
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ers, adhering to its earlier decision in Federal Base Ball Club of
Baltimore, Inc., v. National League of Professional Base Ball Clubs.5'
The Court found that the U.S. Congress did not intend to sub-
ject baseball to the antitrust laws, and that only the legislature,
and not the courts, could render baseball susceptible to the
Sherman Act.58
The U.S. Supreme Court revisited Major League Baseball's
antitrust exemption for perhaps a final time in 1972," 9 in Flood v.
Kuhn,60 holding that only the U.S. Congress could repeal the
exemption.6' To date, Congress has not revoked MLB's antitrust
exemption.62  Notably, baseball is the only organized profes-
sional sport in the United States that is exempt from federal anti-
trust laws. 63
Fifteen years later, allegations of antitrust violations were at
the core of a dispute between the Players and Owners.' In Sep-
tember, 1987, an arbitrator ruled on the first of three collusion
grievances that the Players' Association had filed against the
Owners.65 The initial complaint alleged that following the 1985
baseball season, the Owners had conspired to not sign free
agents. 66  The Owners, however, could not defend on the
grounds of baseball's antitrust exemption, as they had explicitly
agreed in the collective bargaining agreement with the Players'
Clause," a provision granting exclusive and perpetual rights to that player's services, to
the team that first signed that player to a contract. Id.
57. Id. at 356-57.
58. Id. Two Justices dissented in the case, pointing out what they perceived as the
inescapable truth that professional baseball was indeed in interstate commerce, and
thus subject to federal regulations. Id. at 357-58.
59. See Robert G. Berger, After the Strikes: A Reexamination of Professional Baseball's
Exemption from the Antitrust Laws, 45 U. Prrr. L. REv. 209, 221 (1983) (reviewing history
of baseball's exemption and concluding that Supreme Court is unlikely to review ex-
emption in near future).
60. 407 U.S. 258 (1972) (Douglas, Marshall, & Brennan, JJ., dissenting).
61. Flood, 407 U.S. at 285. "[T]he remedy if any is indicated, is for congressional,
and not judicial action." Id. Three Justices dissented, agreeing that the Court's deci-
sion in Federal Base Ball Club of Baltimore was found to be "a derelict in the stream of the
law that we, its creator, should remove." Id. at 258, 286.
62. Mark Maske & Frank Swoboda, Congress to Receive Antitrust Bill; Legislation Would
Limit Not Repeal, Baseball's 73-Year Old Exemption, WASH. PosT, Feb. 11, 1995, at B1 (dis-
cussing exemption and proposed legislation to modify it).
63. Mark Lacter, Why Don't Baseball's Owners and Players Learn To Play Nice, TAMPA
TRIB., Feb. 18, 1995, at 17.
64. Long Road to Stalemate, supra note 35, at B12.
65. Id.
66. Id.
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not to engage in such restraints of trade." The arbitrator subse-
quently ruled in favor of the Players' Association,m prompting
the Owners, who were fearful of two additional adverse rulings,
to settle all three grievances for a total of US$280 million in
damages.69 The settlement amount represented what the Own-
ers would have paid the Players had they not colluded.7 °
While the antitrust exemption did not affect the collusion
disputes, the Players' Association believes that the exemption is
playing a significant role in the current labor dispute.7 ' In an
attempt to secure a new collective bargaining agreement, the
Owners proposed that MLB establish a salary cap (or "cap"), a
pre-set spending limit on Players' salaries. 72 Ordinarily, under
the federal antitrust laws, owners who conspire to or in fact im-
plement a cap on salaries throughout an industry are guilty of
price fixing, an illegal restraint of trade.7" If Major League Base-
ball was subject to the antitrust laws, the Players' Association
would be able to challenge in federal court any unilateral imple-
mentation of a salary cap by the Owners.74 Furthermore, the
Players have to end the strike if the U.S. Congress repealed the
exemption.75
67. Id.
68. Id. The Owners agreed to pay the damages on December 21, 1990. Id.
69. Alan Truex, Hook or Crook, Owners Cling to Anti-Trust Exemption, Hous. CHRON.,
Mar. 5, 1995, at 3.
70. Id.
71. Narrow Repeal of Baseball's Antitrust Exemption Would End Strike, Union'Says, 183
Daily Lab. Rep. (BNA) at D-18 (1994) [hereinafter Narrow Repeal].
72. Long Road to Stalemate, supra note 35, at B12.
73. 15 U.S.C. §§ 1-3; Andrew C. Miller, Senate Scolds Adversaries; Owners, Players Take
Beating During Hearing on Antitrust Exemption, KAN. Crry STAR, Feb. 16, 1995, at D1 [here-
inafter Senate Scolds Adversaries].
74. Senate Scolds Adversaries, supra note 73, at DI.
With the exemption in place, if the owners declare the negotiations at an im-
passe and impose a salary cap, the union has no recourse to challenge the
terms as unreasonable restraints of trade under the antitrust laws nor does the
union have the right to injunctive relief while the antitrust challenge is pend-
ing.
Narrow Repeal, supra note 71, at D-18.
75. Narrow Repeal, supra note 71, at D-18. As of the writing of this Note, a bill to
limit MLB's antitrust exemption was pending before the U.S. SenateJudiciary Commit-
tee. Senate Subcommittee Approves Bill To Lift Baseball Antitrust Exemption, 66 Daily Lab.
Rep. (BNA) at D-8 (Apr. 6, 1995). The U.S. Senate Judiciary Subcommittee on Anti-
trust, Monopolies, and Business Rights voted unanimously in favor of the bill, which
would allow players to sue team owners for antitrust violations in labor negotiations. Id.
The full U.S. Senate Judiciary Committee will consider the bill in May 1995. Id. If the
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Currently, under the exemption, once negotiations deterio-
rate to the point that the parties are unable to make any pro-
gress, the Owners may declare an impasse and legally implement
their proposed salary cap with or without the approval of the
Players' Association.76 While the Owners have firmly defended
the antitrust exemption, 7 a recent decision handed down by the
U.S. Court of Appeals for the D.C. Circuit may have rendered
the issue moot.78
Ruling on an appeal brought by the team owners of the Na-
tional Football League ("NFL"), the D.C. Circuit held that a
non-statutory exemption, created by the courts, shields employ-
ers from antitrust suits in certain circumstances. 79 The protec-
tions of this non-statutory exemption take effect when an em-
ployer imposes restraints on competition through the context of
the collective bargaining process, after having bargained in good
faith to impasse."0 Under this ruling, the twenty-eight MLB
Judiciary Committee approves the bill, then the U.S. Congress will have the opportunity
to vote it into law. Id.
76. Mark Maske, Baseball's Labor Talks Collapse; Team Owners Install Salary Cap Sys-
tem; Litigation Looms, WASH. PosT, Dec. 23, 1994, at Al [hereinafter Baseball's Labor Talks
Collapse].
77. Narrow Repeal, supra note 71, at D-18.
78. See Brown v. Pro Football, Inc., No. CIVA90-01071, 1995 WL 115729 (D.C.
Cir. Mar. 21, 1995) (Wald, J., dissenting) (holding that in context of collective bargain-
ing, antitrust laws do not apply). In Brown, nine players sued the NFL after the team
owners unilaterally imposed a fixed salary for players on a practice squad. Id. The
owners' action occurred after labor negotiations had stalled, reaching an impasse. Id.
The District Court for the District of Columbia ruled in favor of the players, finding that
the owners violated the Sherman Antitrust Act, by engaging in illegal price-fixing and
restraint of trade. Id. The District Court awarded the players US$30,349,642 in dam-
ages. Id.
79. Id. at *2.
Restraints on competition lawfully imposed through the collective bargaining
process are exempted from antitrust liability so long as such restraints primar-
ily affect only the labor market organized around the collective bargaining
relationship. Thus, employees confronted with actions imposed lawfully
through the collective bargaining process must respond not with a lawsuit
brought under the Sherman Act, but rather with the weapons provided by the
Federal labor laws.
Id.
80. Id.; see Kiernan M. Corcoran, When Does the Buzzer Sound?: The Nonstatutoy La-
bor Exemnption in Professional Sports, 94 COLUM. L. Rxv. 1045, 1053 (1994) (discussing the
non-statutory labor exemption in professional sports). A majority of courts follow a
three-pronged test set forth by the Eighth Circuit in Mackey v. National Football
League, 543 F.2d. 606 (8th Cir. 1976), "to decide labor exemption issues in player re-
straint cases." Id. For the exemption to apply:
First, the labor policy favoring collective bargaining may potentially be given
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Owners could unilaterally implement a salary cap, an industry
wide price-fixing mechanism, provided that they first bargain to
impasse with the Players' Association."
3. The Owner's Bargaining Position in the Current Dispute
For the 1994 baseball season, the Owners were scheduled to
pay the Players' approximately US$1.004 billion, an amount
equal to fifty-eight percent of the total revenues for MLB.8 2 This
amount marked a sharp increase from 1984, when the Players
collectively earned US$240 million, or forty percent of MLB's
total revenues.8" The Owners, who believed that the escalating
Players' salaries would result in financial chaos for themselves
and MLB,8 4 unanimously agreed on June 8, 1994, to insist on the
implementation of a salary cap in any new collective bargaining
agreement with the Players' Association.8" In support of their
bargaining position, the Owners alleged that nineteen of the
twenty-eight teams were currently losing money,8" and that a
pre-eminence over the antitrust laws where the restraint on trade primarily
affects only the parties to the collective bargaining relationship. Second, fed-
eral labor policy is implicated sufficiently to prevail only where the agreement
sought to be exempted concerns a mandatory subject of collective bargaining.
Finally, the policy favoring collective bargaining is furthered to the degree
necessary to override the antitrust laws only where the agreement sought to be
exempted is the product of a bona fide arm's-length bargaining.
Mackey, 543 F.2d. at 614.
81. See id. The D.C. Circuit's decision, however, seems to be in conflict with the
goals of the NLRA, to eliminate practices by employers that are destructive to collective
bargaining and which augment the inequality in bargaining power between employers
and employees. See 29 U.S.C. § 151 (1988) (discussing purpose of NLRA to eliminate
inequality of bargaining power).
82. Baseball May Throw Curve, supra note 28, at Al.
83. E.M. Swift, The Perfect Square; Union Chief Don Fehr May Be a Humorless Bookworm,
but Major League Baseball Players Laugh All the Way to the Bank, SPORTS ILLUSTRATED, Mar.
8, 1993, at 32.
84. A Divisive Dilemma, supra note 31, at 51.
85. Richard Justice, Baseball Closer to a Strike; Owners Agree to Cap on Player Salaries,
WAsH. PosT,June 9, 1994, at D1 [hereinafter Baseball Closer to a Strike]. The Owners also
agreed that a new CBA may only be ratified if at least 21 out of the 28 teams vote for it.
Id.
86. Richard Justice, Baseball's Survival of the Richest; Labor Dispute Puts Focus on Strug-
gles of Small Markets, WASH. POST, July 24, 1994, at DI [hereinafter Baseball's Survival of
Richest]. The Pittsburgh Pirates are alleged to be losing US$1,000,000 a month even
though the team has reduced its payroll to US$20,000,000. Id. The Owners believe
that "[t]he Pittsburgh Pirates are a microcosm for all that is wrong with baseball," and
that the teams in Montreal, Minnesota, Oakland, Seattle, San Diego, Milwaukee, and
Houston are all in similar positions. Id.
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growing disparity in team payrolls was eroding league competi-
tion.8 7
The Owners grounded their concern over the league's com-
petitive balance in the belief that small market teams"8 with lim-
ited financial resources cannot successfully compete against
teams in larger markets, 9 which have significantly higher pay-
rolls. 9° For example, the San Diego Padres ("Padres"), a small
market team, have a team payroll of US$15,500,000, while the
Atlanta Braves ("Atlanta"), a large market team, maintain a pay-
roll of US$52,000,000. 91 Consequently, a team in an economic
position similar to that of the Padres cannot afford to re-sign its
talented players once they become free agents, as the larger mar-
ket teams possess the financial resources to outbid them.92 Lee
MacPhail, the General Manager of the Minnesota Twins, insists
that unless a salary cap is implemented, forcing every team to
maintain a payroll in roughly the same economic neighborhood,
as many as ten of the current MLB teams will soon go out of
business.93
4. The Players' Response to the Proposed Salary Cap
While the Owners proposed to overhaul the economic
structure of MLB through the implementation of a salary cap
system, 94 the Players' Association was initially only interested in
maintaining the status quo. 95 The Players responded to the
87. Owners Reject New Offer, supra note 48, at Dl.
88. Baseball's Survival of Richest, supra note 86, at Dl. A small market team is con-
sidered to be one where "the fans don't come out in droves" to see the team play, and
where the team does not receive a large amount of revenue from the contracts it has
with the local television and radio stations. Id. One such example is the Montreal
Expos, who despite having one of the best teams in all of MLB, average only 22,000 fans
per game. Id. The Minnesota Twins are' another small team, pulling in US$20,000,000
a year in local broadcasting contracts. Id.
89. Id. The New York Yankees are a large market team, earning US$50,000,000 a
year from its contracts with the local television and radio stations. Id.
90. Id.
91. Id.
92. Id. In 1991, the Minnesota Twins, a small market team, won the World Series.
Id. The following year, the team could not afford to re-sign its star players, and conse-
quendy four key players for the Twins left for other teams, through free agency. Id.
93. Id. "You can't continue to have the payroll disparities we have today." Id.
" he danger is that nine or ten markets across North America will wither and die be-
cause they don't have a viable chance." Id.
94. Baseball Closer to a Strike, supra note 85, at D1.
95. Labor of Glove, supra note 1, at HI.
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Owners' proposal by asserting that they were intent on keeping
the current free-market system.96 The salary cap would inhibit
players' salaries, restrict the ability of free agents to sell their
services, and potentially result in arbitration awards that exceed
the cap's monetary limit.97 Consequently, the Players' Associa-
tion rejected the salary cap, proposing that a new collective bar-
gaining agreement contain only minor changes, such as an in-
crease in MLB's minimum wage, from US$109,000 a year to
US$200,000, and the elimination of certain restrictions on free
agency and salary arbitration.98
The Players also responded specifically to the Owners' as-
serted justifications for a salary cap, attempting to refute each of
the Owners' claims. At the request of the Players' Association,
Roger Noll,99 an economist at Stanford University, examined the
Owners' profit and loss projections.100 According to Noll's re-
port ("Noll Report"), the Owners vastly understated the financial
performance of the twenty-eight teams, perhaps by as much as
US$140,000,000.10 1 The Noll Report concluded that player com-
pensation was not responsible for any claimed financial troubles
in MLB, and that baseball was economically healthy.
10 2
Noll's findings also discredited the Owners' assertion that
nineteen teams were losing money.10 3 According to the Noll Re-
port, from 1991 to 1993, only four of the twenty-eight teams in
96. Owners Reject New Offer, supra note 48, at DI.
97. Tom Verducci, In the Strike Zone; the Players, Dead Set Against the Owners'Demands
for a Salary Cap, Are on the Brink of a Walkout that Could Jeopardize the World Series, SPORTS
ILLuSTRATED, Aug. 1, 1994, at 26.
98. Labor of Glove, supra note 1, at HI.
99. Murray Chass, Basebal4 Economist Hired by Union Disputes Owners' Loss Claims,
N.Y. TIMES, Aug. 25, 1994, at B9 [hereinafter Economist Hired by Union]. The Players'
Association has previously employed Noll to analyze the Owners' financial data. Id. In
1985, during contract negotiations, Noll released his conclusions, which the Owners
severely criticized. Id. In the end, however, Noll's analysis was recognized as a more
accurate depiction of MLB's economic state. Id.
100. Id. The Owners supplied Noll with their own economic data, attempting to
support their contention that MLB needs a cap. Id. This was the same financial data
upon which the Owners' based their economic projections for MLB. Id.
101. Id.
102. Id. "[T ] he claim of widespread financial disaster in the sport is pure fiction."
Id. "Total player compensation in professional baseball, contrary to widespread belief,
is not increasing faster than revenues and cannot reasonably ,be said to be causing a
decline in the financial status of the sport." Id.
103. Mark Maske & Tracee Hamilton, Players'Study Finds Owners Underestimated Prof-
ts, WASH. PosT, Aug. 24, 1994, at Cl.
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Major League Baseball actually incurred losses.' 0 4 The report
did acknowledge that every year a few teams actually lose
money.'0 5 Noll, however, believed that MLB's current economic
structure was not the cause of these losses, and that with the ex-
ception of two teams, Pittsburgh and Seattle, the rest of the
league will continue to earn annual profits.'0 6 The report
faulted such factors as inadequacies in the League's television
contract, 10 7 creative bookkeeping,108 and the Owners' excessive
administrative expenditures,0 9 for the financial difficulties that
some of the teams may be experiencing. 1°
5. The Proposals and Counter-Proposals
The Owners' initial proposal to the Players' Association for
a new collective bargaining agreement contained a salary cap,
which would employ half of the league's revenue towards Play-
ers' salaries."' Under this plan, each team would be obligated
to spend at least eighty-four percent of the league average pay-
roll on Players' wages."' While team Owners could spend
104. Economist Hired ly Union, supra note 99, at B9. Kansas City, Milwaukee, Pitts-
burgh, and San Francisco all had cash-flow losses during this period., Id.
105. Id.
106. Id. A few teams actually lose money each year, but none "are fated to be
persistent losers in the present structure," except perhaps for Seattle and Pittsburgh.
Id.
107. Phil Rogers, Players Face Blame with Hardball Stance, DALLAS MORNING NEWS,
Sept. 12, 1994, at B6. MLB agreed to a partnership deal with the National Broadcasting
Company, and the American Broadcasting Company, effectively quelling competitive
bidding for baseball's broadcasting rights. Id. Consequently, MLB sustained a signifi-
cant drop in broadcasting revenue. Id. While each team had earned about
US$14,000,000 a year from the previous television contract, the current contract pays
the Owners about half of that amount. Id.
108. Economist Hired by Union, supra note 99, at B9. The Owners did not include in
their financial statements the US$190,000,000 that they received in expansion fees from
two new teams. Id. The Owners employed a legal accounting method that permitted
the omission of these funds. Id. Had these fees been included in the financial state-
ments, six teams that reported losses would have reported profits. Id.
' 109. Id. Noll discussed two teams that reported virtually identical total revenues
and player salaries. Id. Over a two year period, one of the teams reported losses while
the other was profitable. Id. Noll discovered that the chief difference between the two
clubs was that the one that reported losses spent nearly 50% more on general and
administrative expenses. Id. Additionally, Noll found that the Philadelphia Phillies re-
ported a loss in 1994 of US$1,025,000, almost the exact amount by which the Phillies
were planning to increase their administrative expenditures. Id.
110. Id.
111. Baseball's Survival of Richest, supra note 86, at Dl.
112. Id.
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money above the eighty-four percent level, they would be pro-
hibited from spending any money above the cap, which was set
at one-hundred and ten percent of the current average team
payroll. 113 The Players' Association formally rejected this propo-
sal on July 18, 1994, approximately one month after the Owners
first introduced it." 4
Almost two months later, on September 8, 1994, the Players
presented a plan to the Owners that included a modest salary
control mechanism." 5 The proposal called for teams to share
with each other twenty-five percent of their gate receipts from
each game, with a one and one-half percent tax levied on both
the total revenues for MLB and the player payrolls for the
league's sixteen highest revenue teams." 6 The Owners rejected
this proposal one day after receiving it." 7
In mid-October, the parties agreed, at the request of U.S.
President Bill Clinton, to allow former U.S. Labor Secretary Wil-
liam J. Usery to mediate the dispute."" Despite Usery's exper-
tise, the Owners and Players were unable to conclude an agree-
ment, spending the ensuing six months rejecting numerous pro-
posals." 9 The parties were unable to resolve their primary point
113. Id. Based on the average league payroll in 1994, Owners would be able to
spend anywhere between US$25,200,000 and US$33,000,000 on their players' salaries.
Id.
114. Long Road to Stalemate, supra note 35, at B12.
115. Id.; Mark Maske, Owners Reject Proposa" Union Rebuffed as Hope for Baseball Settle-
ment Fades, WASH. PosT, Sept. 10, 1994, at G1 [hereinafter Union Rebuffed].
116. Union Rebuffed, supra note 115, at G1.
117. Id.
118. Mark Maske, Ex-Labor Secretary Usery To Mediate Baseball Meetings, WASH. POST,
Oct. 15, 1994, at C1. Secretary of Labor, Robert Reich, called Usery "the nation's top
mediator." Id. Usery served as national director of the Federal Mediation and Concilia-
tion Service between 1973 and 1976. Id.
119. See Mark Maske, Owners Eye Replacement Teams; If Strike Goes on, Substitutes Could
Start '95 Season, WASH. PosT, Nov. 30, 1994, at BI (discussing Owner proposal contain-
ing salary cap, eliminating salary arbitration and reducing free agency eligibility to four
years of service); Mark Maske, Players Disclose New Plan; Breakdown in Talks Could Be in
Offing, WASH. POST, Dec. 11, 1994, at DlI (outlining Players' proposal of having Own-
ers share gate receipts, imposing five percent tax on team payrolls, and creating
US$60,000,000 industry growth fund, contributed to equally by both parties); Owners
Make New Proposa4 Baseball Negotiations Resume, WASH. PosT, Feb. 2,1995, at DI (explain-
ing Owners' plan to impose 75% tax on all money devoted to player compensation
above US$35,000,000 threshold); Mark Maske, Baseball Talks Take Turn for Worse; Own-
ers, Players Dismiss Each Other's Taxation System Proposals, WASH. POST, Mar. 5, 1995, at D1
[hereinafter Baseball Talks Take Turn for Worse] (describing Players' plan to impose 25%
tax on all money spent on player compensation above level of 133% of average league
salary).
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of contention, the Owners' desire to suppress Players' salaries.
121
Consequently, on March 1, 1995, the Owners' replacement play-
ers participated in their first pre-season game. 12 1 With the start
of the 1995 season only a few short weeks away, 12 2 the labor ne-
gotiations stalled. 21
6. Unfair Labor Practice Charges During the Strike
In August 1994, the Owners failed to pay approximately
US$8 million to the Players' pension plan, as the collective bar-
gaining agreement required.2 4 The Owners' defended their re-
fusal to pay by stating that their obligation to make the payment
expired, as had the agreement. 25 The Players promptly retorted
that the obligation still existed, and subsequently filed an unfair
labor practice charge with the National Labor Relations Board
126
(or "NLRB" or "Board").127 The NLRB, following an investiga-
tion, issued a complaint, the equivalent of an indictment, against
the Owners for their failure to make the pension payment.'
28
The Owners similarly filed an unfair labor practice charge
against the Players.'2 9  The Owners alleged in their complaint
120. Mark Maske, Payroll Tax Still Separates Sides; Baseball Union, Owners Talk Amica-
bly, but Have Not Bridged Gap, WASH. PosT, Mar. 2, 1995, at Cl.
121. Id.
122. Baseball Talks Take Turn for Worse, supra note 119, at Dl. The 1995 season was
scheduled to open on April 2, with replacement players. Id. On March 30, 1995, the
Owners officially adopted a plan to open the baseball season with replacement players.
Baseball Owners Formally Adopt Plan To Play 1995 Season with Replacements, 62 Daily Lab.
Rep. (BNA) at D-20 (Mar. 31, 1995). Twenty-six owners voted in favor of the plan while
two owners voted against it. Id.
123. Baseball Talks Take Turn for Worse, supra note 119, at Dl.
124. Owners Withhold Pension Payments, UPI, Aug. 3, 1994, available in Westlaw, Pa-
pers Database.
125. Id. The pension plan provisions contained in the agreement expired on
March 31, 1994. Id.
126. 29 U.S.C. § 153 (1988). The National Labor Relations Board consists of five
members appointed by the President of the United States with the consent of the U.S.
Senate. Id. Under Section 10 of the NLRA, the NLRB is empowered "to prevent any
person from engaging in any unfair labor practice." Id. § 160(a). The NLRB has au-
thority, upon issuance of a complaint charging a party with an unfair labor practice, to
petition a U.S. district court for temporary injunctive relief. Id. § 160g).
127. Mark Maske, Union's Orza Scoffs at Fiday Deadline, WAsH. POST, Sept. 7, 1994,
at B3.
128. Thomas Boswell, Oumers'Monster About To Turn on them, WASH. PosT, Dec. 21,
1994, at Fl.
129. Mark Maske, Baseball Talks Remain at an Impasse; No Progress on Payroll Taxation
System; Charge of Unfair Labor Practice Is Dismissed, WASH. PosT, Dec. 21, 1994, at F1.
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that certain members of the Players' Association had uttered
threatening remarks towards replacement players.15 0 The
Board, however, found no merit in the charge, and summarily
dismissed it.''
Two days after the NLRB's dismissal of the Owners' charge,
the Owners declared an impasse in the labor negotiations, and
exercised their right to impose the last proposal they had of-
fered, the salary cap.132 The Players Association immediately re-
sponded by filing another unfair labor practice charge with the
NLRB, accusing the Owners of failing to bargain in good faith
and thus illegally declaring an impasse.13 3  The Players peti-
tioned the .NLRB to seek an injunction in federal district court
to prevent the Owners from implementing the salary cap.13 4
The Board investigated the charge and was once again prepared
to issue a complaint against the Owners.135 The Players, Owners,
and NLRB agreed, however, that the Board would refrain from
issuing a complaint, the Owners would withdraw their imple-
mentation of the salary cap, and all parties would return to the
negotiating table.'3 6
Following six more weeks of failed negotiations, the Players
filed another charge with the NLRB against the Owners for their
alleged failure' to bargain in good faith.3 7 The Board subse-
quently issued another complaint against the Owners,13 8 and
scheduled a May 22, 1995, hearing for the Players and Owners
before an administrative law judge ("ALJ"). as The ALJ will de-
termine if the Owners committed an unfair labor practice when
130. Id.
131. Id.
132. Mark Maske, Baseballs Labor Talks Collapse; Team Owners Install Salary Cap Sys-
tem; Litigation Looms, WASH. PoST, Dec. 23, 1994, at Al.
133. Mark Maske, Both Sides File Charges with the NLRB; Baseball Players, Owners Say
Good Faith Lacking, WASH. Posr, Dec. 28, 1994, at Cl.
134. Id.
135. Owners Withdraw Salary Cap; Move Halts Complaint &y Labor Relations Board,
WASH. PosT, Feb. 4, 1995, at Hi.
136. Id.
137. Mark Maske, NLRB To File Complaint on Owners; Move Could Result in Baseball
Players Ending Strike, but Owners May Counter with Lockout, WASH. POST, Mar. 15, 1995, at
Fl.
138. Mark Maske, Union Says No to Replacements'Stats, WASH. PosT, Mar. 16,,1995, at
BI [hereinafter Union Says No]. The Board charged the Owners with "unfair labor prac-
tices for unilaterally eliminating the salary arbitration system and anti-collusion protec-
tions for free agent players." Id.
139. Id.
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they collectively decided not to sign any free agents and to elimi-
nate the system of salary arbitration; thereby violating the anti-
collusion terms contained in the now expired CBA.
140
In the mean time, the NLRB authorized its General Coun-
sel141 to seek an injunction in federal court to force the Owners
to rescind their unilateral changes of terms contained in the col-
lective bargaining agreement. 142  The General Counsel subse-
quently filed' a petition 141 for such an injunction with Judge
Sonia Sotomayor, federal district court judge for the Southern
District of New York. 44 Judge Sotomayor held an expedited
hearing on March 31, 1995, to determine if circumstances war-
ranted the issuance of an injunction. 145 Prior to the hearing, the
Players vowed to end the strike if they succeeded in obtaining an
injunction, forcing the Owners to reinstate the former work-
rules."4 The Owners, however, threatened to lockout the Play-
ers if they tried to return to work before both parties had con-
cluded an agreement.
147
Following oral arguments by representatives for the NLRB,
the Players' Association, and the Owners, Judge Sotomayor held
that the NLRB had reasonable cause to find that the Owners
committed unfair labor practices and that a temporary injunc-
140. Id. As of the writing of this Note, the ALJ had not yet heard the merits of the
case. See id. (discussing scheduled date of hearing).
141. 29 U.S.C. § 153(d) (1988). The General Counsel has final authority, on be-
half of the Board, "in respect of the investigation of charges and issuance of complaints
before the Board, and shall have such other duties as the Board may prescribe or as
may be provided by law." Id.
142. Labor Board To Seek Injunction, supra note 3, at Al. "The injunction would
force the club owners to restore certain elements of the expired collective bargaining
agreement, including salary arbitration and competitive bidding for free agents." Id.
143. Silverman v. Major League Baseball Player Relations Committee Inc., 95 Civ.
2054 (SS) (1995). The Petition alleges that the Owners violated Sections 8(a) (1) and
8(a) (5) of the NLRA by: "unilaterally eliminating, before an impasse had been
reached, salary arbitration for certain reserve players, competitive bargaining for cer-
tain free agents, and the anti-collusion provision of the collective bargaining agree-
ment, Article XX(F)." Id.
144. Id.
145. Dominic Bencivenga, Baseball Strike Hearing Set for Friday, N.Y.L.J., Mar. 28,
1995, at 1. The General Council will have to prove that there is "reasonable cause to
believe" that an appellate court would uphold a potential NLRB finding that the Own-
ers committed an unfair labor practice and that a temporary injunction would prevent
irreparable injury to the Players. Id.
146. Labor Board To Seek Action for Players; Owners May Impose Lockout If Strike Ends,
CHI. TRiB., Mar. 18, 1995, at N3.
147. Id.
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tion was a proper remedy. 48 In so holding, Judge Sotomayor
found that the Owners had unlawfully changed certain
mandatory subjects of bargaining 49 when they unilaterally insti-
tuted a freeze on hiring free agents, and eliminated salary arbi-
tration and the anti-collusion provision contained in the CBA.15 0
Judge Sotomayor further found that the Owners' unilateral
changes had disrupted the equality in bargaining power between
the parties, and that the issuance of an injunction would restore
the balance that existed prior to the Owners' illegal acts.15 '
148. Silverman v. Major League Baseball Player Relations Committee Inc., 1995
WL 144799 (S.D.N.Y.). Judge Sotomayor concluded the following:
[T]he Board has reasonable cause to believe that the [O]wneis have commit-
ted an unfair labor practice, and that an injunction is just and proper to avoid
irreparable injury and to ensure that the [O]wners and Players continue bar-
gaining in good faith, until the resolution of the disputes, or a genuine im-
passe untainted by the unfair labor practices, or the determination by the
NLRB of the charges before it, whichever occurs earliest.
Id. at *1.
149. Id. at *5. The U.S. Supreme Court categorizes subjects for collective bargain-
ing as either mandatory or permissive. NLRB v. Wooster Div. of Borg-Warner Corp.,
356 U.S. 342, 349 (1958). Mandatory subjects of bargaining are those which affect
wages, hours, and other terms and conditions of employment, while permissive subjects
are all other matters. Id.; NLRB v. Katz, 369 U.S. 736, 742-43 (1962).
The distinction between mandatory and permissive subjects of bargaining is
crucial in labor disputes, because it determines to what extent one party may
compel the other to bargain over a given proposal: mandatory subjects re-
quire the parties to bargain in good faith, whereas no such requirement ad-
heres to permissive subjects.
Major League Baseball Player Relations Committee Inc., 1995 WL 144799 at *5. A party may
not unilaterally change a mandatory subject of bargaining contained in an expired
CBA, during the interim between agreements, without first reaching a good faith im-
passe. Katz, 369 U.S. at 746. Such a unilateral change is an unfair labor practice under
Section 8(d) of the NLRA, violating the duty to bargain in good faith. 29 U.S.C.
§ 158(d).
150. Major League Baseball Player Relations Committee Inc., 1995 WL 144799 at *7-*9.
The owners can, if they successfully bargain, end the free agency and salary
arbitration systems, exclude the anti-collusion provision, and create an entirely
new system. What they cannot do is alter particular individual's wages until
the system is changed by agreement or until the parties negotiate to impasse
.... Having freely entered into the free agency and reserve systems in their
Basic (Collective Bargaining] Agreement, the owners are bound to that system
until they bargain in good faith to an impasse.
Id. at *9.
151. Id. at *11. Injunctive relief is proper to: "prevent irreparable injury to the
party injured by the unfair labor practice; restore or preserve the status quo that existed
prior to the violation; protect the Board's ability to issue a final remedy; or protect the
public interest in the collective bargaining process." Id. at *7 (citations omitted). Judge
Sotomayor found that an injunction was proper under all four of the requisite grounds.
Id. at *11-*13. "In a very real and immediate way, this strike has placed the entire
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Consequently, an injunction was issued against the Owners, or-
dering them to reinstate the former work rules and to bargain in
good faith with the Players Association until an agreement is
concluded, or a true good faith impasse is reached.1 2
7. The MLB Labor Dispute After the Injunction
Judge Sotomayor's ruling prompted the Players' Association
to immediately end the strike and offer to return to work,153
while the Owners responded by filing a petition, with the Court
of Appeals for the Second Circuit, to stay the injunction.' 54 A
few days after the injunction was issued, a three-judge panel for
the Second Circuit denied the Owners' request to stay the in-
junction, asserting that the NLRB andJudge Sotomayor had just
cause to believe that the Owners had unilaterally and unlawfully
changed certain mandatory terms of the collective bargaining
agreement. 15 5 With no immediate relief from the injunction,
and without a new collective bargaining agreement, the Owners
accepted the Players' offer to return to work, officially ending
the 234-day strike.'56
concept of collective bargaining on trial. It is critical, therefore, that the Board ensure
that the spirit and letter of federal labor law be scrupulously followed." Id. at * 11.
152. Id. at *13. The injunction prohibits the Owners from declaring an impasse
without first demonstrating to the court that "despite a reasonable passage of time ne-
gotiating in good faith the full mandatory bargaining terms of the expired Basic Agree-
ment," the parties have been unable to conclude a new agreement. Id. at 14.
153. Murray Chass, Backed By Court, Baseball Players Call Strike Over, N.Y. TIMEs, Apr.
1, 1995, § 1, at 1.
154. John Herzfeld, Judge Issues 10(j) Injunction Ordering Baseball Ownership To Re-
store Status Quo, 63 Daily Lab. Rep. (BNA) at D-23 (Apr. 3, 1995).
155. John Herzfeld, Appeals Panel Denies Bid for Stay of 10(j) Injunction in Baseball
Case, 65 Daily Lab. Rep. (BNA) at D-18 (Apr. 5, 1995). According to ChiefJudgeJon 0.
Newman, "the law of this circuit is that under these facts, free agency is a mandatory
topic." Id. Following the court's ruling, Fred Feinstein, the General Counsel for the
NLRB, characterized the ruling as "another victory for the NLRB, for collective bargain-
ing, and for baseball." Id. Feinstein opined that "the court has again recognized the
need to appropriately enforce labor law so that collective bargaining can have a chance
of succeeding." Id.
156. Murray Chass, Baseball Owners Quit Fight; Opening Day Is Set for April 26, N.Y.
TairEs, Apr. 3, 1995, § 1, at 1. The Owners welcomed the Players back on April 2, 1995,
what was originally supposed to be the season's opening day. Id. The Owners did not
vote on whether to lockout the Players. Id. The Owners, however, have locked out
MLB's umpires, who are seeking an increase in wages. Murray Chass, Umpires Trying To
Block Replacements in Toronto, N.Y. TIMEs, Apr. 22, 1995, at 36. MLB is scheduled to open
its season on April 25, 1995. Id. MLB plans to use replacement umpires for all games
until a settlement is reached with the locked-out umpires. Id. The Toronto Blue Jays'
opening game is set for April 26, 1995, at their home stadium in Toronto. Murray
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B. An Overview of the International Labour Organisation
The International Labour Organisation (or "Organisation"
or "ILO") is a Specialized Agency of the United Nations' 57 with
universally recognized expertise and competence in labor mat-
ters. 158 Since its establishment in 1919, under the Treaty of Ver-
sailles,1" 9 the Organisation has dedicated its efforts towards the
improvement of labor standards on an international level.16
The Constitution of the ILO, 1 1 together with an expanding
body of case law, and the more than 170 Conventions162 and 175
Recommendations 6 3 promulgated by the Organisation, 16 4 com-
prise the principal source of international labor law.165
Chass, Umpires Hope Law Might Be on Their Side, N.Y. TiMEs, Apr. 24, 1995, at C3. The
Ontario Labour Relations Board has scheduled a hearing for the morning of April 25,
1995, to hear arguments on whether the MLB may use replacement umpires in To-
ronto. Id. Ontario provincial law bans the use of replacement workers during a strike
or lockout. Id.; The Labour Relations Act, R.S.O., ch. 21 § 73.1 (1992) (Can.). Repre-
sentatives for MLB are expected to argue that the statutory ban is not applicable to
them as they are not Ontario-based employers. Umpires Hope Law Might Be on Their Side,
supra, at C3. As of the writing of this Note, the Ontario Labour Relations Board had
not yet heard arguments as to whether MLB may use replacement umpires for the
games in Toronto. See id. (discussing upcoming hearing regarding replacement
umpires).
157. LAMMy BETrr, INTERNATIONAL LABOUR LAW, SELECTED ISSUES 11 (1993). The
ILO became a specialized agency of the United Nations in 1946. Id. Under the Charter
of the United Nations, specialized agencies are established by intergovernmental agree-
ment and have wide international responsibilities, as defined in their basic instruments,
in economic, social, cultural, educational, health, and related fields. U.N. CHARTER art.
57.
158. Lance Compa, Labor Rights and Labor Standards in International Trade, 5 LAw &
POL'Y INT'L Bus. 65 (1993).
159. The Treaty of Versailles, June 28, 1919, pt. XIII, 225 Consol. T.S. 188, 373, 2
MAJOR PEACE TREATIES OF MODERN HISTORY 1648-1967, at 1265, 1508 (Fred L. Israel ed.,
1967).
160. VALriCos, supra note 24, at 42.
161. CONST. OF THE INT'L LAB. ORG., OCt. 9, 1946, 62 Stat. 3490, 15 U.N.T.S. 40
[hereinafter ILO CoNsr.].
162. Id. art. 19(1), 62 Stat. at 3518, 15 U.N.T.S. at 68. "Conventions are instru-
ments designed to create international legal obligations for the states which ratify
them." VALTiCOS, supra note 24, at 44.
163. ILO CONST. art. 19(1), 62 Stat. at 3518, 15 U.N.T.S. at 68. "Recommenda-
tions are not designed to create obligations but to provide guidelines for government
action." VALTCOS, supra note 24, at 44.
164. Compa, supra note 158, at 165. From 1919 to 1994, the ILO adopted 175
Conventions and 182 Recommendations. N. VALTICOS & G. VON POTOBSKY, INTERNA-
TIONAL LABOUR LAw 49-50 (1994).
165. VALTICOs, supra note 24, at 27, 43.
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1. The Structure and Organs of the ILO
The ILO is an international, intergovernmental organiza-
tion 166 comprised of member states, which gain admission by for-
mally accepting the obligations articulated in the Constitution of
the ILO.167 The Organisation employs a tripartite structure,
consisting of representatives from governments, as well as from
employers' and workers' organizations in the member coun-
tries.168 This structure provides equal status for management,
labor, and government representatives in the ILO, thereby ad-
vancing a partnership concept to achieve social peace. 169
The Organisation contains three primary organs: 70 the In-
ternational Labour Conference' 7 1 ("ILC"), the International La-
bour Office 72 ("Office"), and the Governing Body.'17 The ILC
consists of delegations from all member states, comprised of two
government delegates, one employers' and one workers' dele-
gate.' 7 4 The principal responsibility of the ILC is to frame and
adopt Conventions and Recommendations at its annual meet-
ings.' 75 The Conference alone decides whether international
circumstances warrant that a particular proposal should be voted
upon in the form of a Recommendation or a binding Conven-
tion.176
The International Labour Office is primarily responsible for
the collection and publication of information regarding labor
standards and abuses.' 77 The Office further assists the govern-
ments of member states to frame laws and regulations that com-
166. Id. at 28.
167. Id. "[T]he ILO may also admit Members to the Organisation by a vote con-
curred in by two-thirds of the delegates attending the session, including two-thirds of
the Government delegates present and voting." ILO CONST. art. 1(4), 62 Stat. at 3494,
15 U.N.T.S. at 44.
168. VALTIcos, supra note 24, at 27.
169. William R. Simpson, The ILO and Tripartism: Some Reflections; Labor Standards
Cooperation; International Labor Organization's 75th Anniversary, MONTHLY LAB. REV., Sept.
1994, at 40-41.
170. ILO CONST. art. 2, 62 Stat. at 3494-96, 15 U.N.T.S. at 45-46.
171. VALTIcos, supra note 24, at 34; see ILO CONST. art. 2(a), 62 Stat. at 3496, 15
U.N.T.S. at 46 (creating International Labour Conference in ILO).
172. ILO CONST. art. 2(c), 62 Stat. at 3496, 15 U.N.T.S. at 46.
173. Id. art. 2(b), 62 Stat. at 3496, 15 U.N.T.S. at 46.
174. Id. art. 3(1), 62 Stat. at 3496, 15 U.N.T.S. at 46; VALTIcos, supra note.24, at 35.
175. ILO CONST. ar. 19(1), 62 Stat. at 3518, 15 U.N.T.S. at 68; VALTcos, supra
note 24, at 34-35.
176. ILO CONST. art. 19(1), 62 Stat. at 3518, 15 U.N.T.S. at 68.
177. VALricos, supra note 24, at 37.
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ply with Conference decisions and standards.' 78 While the Of-
fice also prepares reports on issues addressed at the ILC,179 per-
haps its most important function is the examination of subjects
that the Office will bring before the ILC, with a goal of conclud-
ing international labor Conventions.'8
Similar to the ILC, the Governing Body is a tripartite or-
gan,181 consisting of twenty-eight government representatives,
fourteen workers' and fourteen employers' representatives.
8 2
Essential aspects of the Governing Body's duties include the ap-
pointment of various ILO committees and the adoption or rejec-
tion of reports prepared by these committees. 83 Two such com-
mittees created by the Governing Body are the influential Com-
mittee on Freedom of Association ("CFA"),184 and the
Committee of Experts on the Application of Conventions and
Recommendations or ("Committee of Experts" or "Commit-
tee") 185
The CFA is also a tripartite body, composed of nine regular
and nine substitute members selected from the governments,
employers' and workers' groups of the Governing Body.'8 6 The
primary responsibility of the CFA is to investigate and dispose of
complaints brought to its attention8 7 so as to safeguard the right
to freedom of association.' Governments, employers' organiza-
178. ILO CONST. art. 10(2) (b), 62 Stat. at 3508, 15 U.N.T.S. at 58; VALTICOS, supra
note 24, at 38.
179. ILO CONST. art. 10(1), (2)(b), 62 Stat. at 3506-08, 15 U.N.T.S. at 56-58.
180. Id. art. 10(1), 62 Stat. at 3506, 15 U.N.T.S. at 56.
181. Id. art. 7, 62 Stat. at 3500-04, 15 U.N.T.S. at 50-54.
182. Id. art. 7(2), 62 Stat. at 3502, 15 U.N.T.S. at 52; ILO Body Questions U.S. Policy
Regarding Permanent Replacement of Striking Workers, 147 Daily Lab. Rep. (BNA) at A-6
(July 31, 1991) [hereinafter ILO Body Questions US. Policy].
183. ILO CONST. art. 14, 62 Stat. at 3514, 15 U.N.T.S. at 64; VALTICOS, supra note
24, at 36.
184. Procedure for the Preliminary Examination of Complaints Alleging Breaches
of Freedom of Association, 34 INT'L LAB. OFF. OFF'L BULL. 208, 209-10 (1951) [herein-
after ILO 1951]; 219th Report of the Committee on Freedom of Association, 65 INT'L
LAB. OFF. OFF'L BULL. 204 (1982); VALTICOS, supra note 24, at 36-37.
185. EBERE OSIEKE, CONSTITUTIONAL LAW AND PRACrICE IN THE INTERNATIONAL LA-
BOUR ORGANISATION 173 (1985).
186. RUTH BEN-ISRAEL, INTERNATIONAL LABOUR STANDARDS: THE CASE OF FREEDOM
TO STRIKE 51 (1988).
187. Id. at 50-53. The CFA reviews a complaint based on the written charges filed
by the complaining party, and the written response of the charged party. Id. Only in
rare circumstances does the CFA hear oral arguments. Id. at 52-53.
188. Id. at 50-51. The CFA safeguards the right to freedom of association for the
Governing Body. Id. at 50; ILO 1951, supra note 184, at 208.
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tions, or workers' organizations may file complaints with the
CFA. 189 Furthermore, complaints may be filed against a govern-
ment that has not ratified the Conventions regarding Freedom
of Association,19 ° Conventions 87191 and 98.192 Since its creation
in 1951, the CFA has developed an extensive body of case law
regarding such issues as collective bargaining and the right to
strike.1 93 Working on behalf of the Governing Body, the CFA is
recognized as the authoritative body to adjudicate issues regard-
ing freedom of association.194
The Committee of Experts typically consists of nineteen in-
dividual members, each appointed by the Governing Body to
serve for an initial term of three years, with the possibility of serv-
ing for an additional three-year term. 195 The members are se-
lected from around the world, and usually possess high creden-
189. BEN-Is.EL, supra note 186, at 51.
190. Id. at 52.
191. ILO Convention No. 87, Freedom of Association and Protection of the Right
to Organise (June 17, 1948) [hereinafter Convention 87], in INTERNATIONAL LABOUR
ORGANISATION, INTERNATIONAL LABOUR CONVENTIONS AND RECOMMENDATIONS: 1919-
1981, at 4 (1982) [hereinafter INT'L LABOUR CONVENTIONS & RECOMMENDATIONS].
Convention 87 came into force on July 4, 1950. Id. Article 2 provides that workers and
employers shall have the right to establish and join organizations of their own choosing.
Id. art. 2, at 4. Under Article 3, these organizations shall have the right "to elect their
representatives in full freedom, to organise their administration and activities and to
formulate their programmes." Id. art. 3(1), at 4. Government authorities must refrain
from any interference that would restrict this right or impede the lawful exercise
thereof. Id. art. 3(2), at 4. Additionally, under Article 8, the "law of the land shall not
be such as to impair, nor shall it be so applied as to impair, the guarantees provided for
in this Convention." Id. art. 8(2), at 5.
192. ILO Convention No. 98, Convention Concerning the Application of Princi-
ples of the Right to Organise and to Bargain Collectively (June 8, 1949) [hereinafter
Convention 98], in INT'L LABOUR CONVENTIONS & RECOMMENDATIONS, Supra note 191,
at 7. This Convention came into force on July 18, 1951. Id. Article I states that
"[w]orkers shall enjoy adequate protection against acts of anti-union discrimination in
respect to their employment." Id. art. 1 (1), at 7. Such protection is particularly di-
rected at acts calculated to "cause the dismissal or otherwise prejudice a worker by rea-
son of union membership or because of participation in union activities" during non-
working hours. Id. art. 2(b), at 7. The Convention further provides in part that
"[w]orkers' and employers organizations shall enjoy adequate protection against any
acts of interference by each other or each other's agents or members in their establish-
ment, functioning or administration." Id. art. 2(1), at 7.
193. VALTICOS, supra note 24, at 61-62. The CFA has heard over 1000 cases since
1951 involving rights corresponding to freedom of association. Id.
194. BEN-ISRAEL, supra note 186, at 51. The CFA has become the "parent commis-
sion acting on behalf of the Governing Body of the ILO, to hear and dispose of com-
plaints." Id.
195. OsiEKE, supra note 185, at 173.
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tials either in the social or legal fields. 196 The proceedings of the
Committee of Experts are strictly confidential, so as to ensure
the objectivity and impartiality of its members.197
The primary functions of the Committee are to study and
evaluate the reports submitted by the various member states of
the ILO, regarding ratified and unratified Conventions, and to
guide governments, where necessary, towards compliance with
ILO standards. 198 The Committee also issues general surveys, re-
ports that clarify the breadth of the ILO Conventions and Rec-
ommendations.1 99 These surveys, which also explain how a gov-
ernment might implement a particular labor standard, draw in-
ternational attention to member states that have failed to comply
with ILO standards over a prolonged period.20
2. The Effect of the ILO Constitution
A basic premise underlying the ILO is that all member
states are bound to adhere to the obligations expressed in its
Constitution.0 1 In 1944, the ILO amended its Constitution, in-
corporating the Declaration of Philadelphia, 2  which broad-
ened the goals of the Organisation.2 0 3 Included among the re-
vised aims of the ILO were numerous civil rights provisions, such
as assertions against discrimination, 0 4 the establishment of mini-
mum wage levels, 20 5 and designs for child welfare. 20 6 Signifi-
196. Id.
197. Id. at 174, "In the discharge of its functions, the Committee of Experts is
guided by the fundamental principles of independence, impartiality and objectivity
.. Id.
198. Id. at 173.
199. Id. at 174.
200. Id.
201. BEN-ISRAEL, supra note 186, at 68. "The principles enunciated in the Constitu-
tion are applicable to all the member states of the Organisation." Id.; see ILO CoNST.
art. 1(3), 62 Stat. at 3492, 15 U.N.T.S. at 42 (explaining that countries become member
states by accepting ILO Constitutional obligations).
202. DECLARATION CONCERNING THE AIMS AND PURPOSES OF THE INTERNATIONAL LA-
BOUR ORCANISATION, Oct. 9, 1946, 62 Stat 3554, 15 U.N.T.S. 104 [hereinafter PHILADEL-
PHIA DECLARATION].
203. BETTEN, supra note 157, at 12.
204. PHILADELPHIA DECLARATION art. II(a), 62 Stat. at 3556, 15 U.N.T.S. at 106.
Article II(a) states that "all human beings, irrespective of race, creed or sex, have the
right to pursue both their material well-being and their spiritual development in condi-
tions of freedom and dignity, of economic security and equal opportunity." Id.
205. Id. art. III(d), 62 Stat. at 3558, 15 U.N.T.S. at 108.
206. Id. art. III(h), 62 Stat. at 3560, 15 U.N.T.S. at 110.
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cantly, the Declaration reaffirmed that the Organisation is
grounded in certain fundamental principles, one of which is the
right to freedom of association. °7 Under the Constitution, all
member states are bound to adhere to the fundamental princi-
ples and aims of the Declaration, as adopted by the ILO. °8 Con-
sequently, since 1944, all member states have been bound by the
principles of freedom of association, even if they have not rati-
fied Conventions 87 and 98.209
3. Conventions and Recommendations of the ILO
Conventions and Recommendations provide additional
sources of international labor law, constituting what may be de-
scribed as the International Labour Code. 10 Conventions are
designed to create international legal obligations for the states
that ratify them .2 1  Each Convention has the effect of an inter-
national treaty, binding only those states that have ratified
it.2 13 While member states are under no affirmative obligation
to ratify Conventions, all states are required to bring each Con-
vention before their respective national legislative authority for
207. Id. art. I(b), 62 Stat. at 3554, 15 U.N.T.S. at 104. The "freedom of expression
and of association are essential to sustained progress [in improving international labor
standards]." Id.
208. ILO CONST. art. 1(3), (4), 62 Stat. at 3492-94, 15 U.N.T.S. at 42-44; BETrEN,
supra note 157, at 13.
209. BETrEN, supra note 157, at 12-13; BEN-IsRtAL, supra note 186, at 67-68.
Accordingly, it was held that member States are bound to apply the basic prin-
ciples which are secured within the ILO Constitution as is the case of the prin-
ciple of freedom of association, even if they did not ratify the ILO Conven-
tions which enunciated such an international labour standard in detail.
Id.
210. VMricos, supra note 24, at 46.
211. Id. at 44.
212. Statute of the International Court of Justice, June 26, 1945, 59 Stat. 1055, 3
Bevans 1179. According to the Statute, the following are sources of international law:
(a) international conventions, whether general or particular, establishing rules ex-
pressly recognised by the contesting states;
(b) international custom, as evidence of a general practice accepted as law;
(c) the general principles of law recognised by civilised nations;
(d) subject to the provisions of Article 59,judicial decisions and the teachings
of the most highly qualified publicists of the various nations, as subsidiary
means for the determination of rules of law.
Id. art. 38, 59 Stat. at 1063, 3 Bevans at 1187 (emphasis added).
213. John Wood, International Labour Organisation Conventions-Labour Code or Trea-
ties?, 40 INr'L & CoMP. L.Q. 649, 656 (July 1991); VATicos, supra note 24, at 45; Ba-
ISRAEL, supra note 186, at 64.
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consideration within one year following its adoption by the
ILC. 14
Once a member state has presented a particular Convention
to the competent legislative authority, a report must be made to
the International Labour Office regarding the disposition of the
Convention.2 15 If the relevant authority adopts, and thereby rati-
fies the Convention, then that state is bound to implement the
various provisions contained therein.2 16 A member state that is
unable to obtain the consent necessary for ratification is obli-
gated to periodically update the International Labour Office on
the current position of the law and practice in regard to the
Convention, and the reasons why that Convention has not yet
been ratified. 17
Although Recommendations are not meant to be binding
upon member states, they do serve as guidelines for government
action.2 1 8 Recommendations have often been employed to sup-
plement the requirements set forth in a Convention.2 19 The
ILO has developed a common practice of adopting a Conven-
tion that outlines basic rules, and then adopting a Recommenda-
tion on the same subject, that further details exactly how govern-
ments might endeavor to implement the more rudimentary lan-
guage of the Convention.2
With respect to ratifying Recommendations, member states
must follow a procedure similar to that of Conventions. 2 1 States
must bring a Recommendation before the competent legislative
authority for approval and report back to the Office whether the
Recommendation was in fact ratified. 22' As is the case with Con-
ventions, if a Recommendation is not ratified, that member state
must periodically apprise the International Labour Office of the
214. ILO CONST. art. 19(5), 62 Stat. at 3520-24, 15 U.N.T.S. at 70-72. The article
allows member states to wait up to eighteen months, in exceptional circumstances,
before bringing the Convention before the relevant legislative authority. Id.; BETrEN,
supra note 157, at 24.
215. ILO CONST. art. 19(5) Cc), 62 Stat. at 3522, 15 U.N.T.S. at 70-72.
216. Id. art. 19(5) (d), 62 Stat. at 3522, 15 U.N.T.S. at 72.
217. Id. art. 19(5) (e), 62 Stat. at 3522-24, 15 U.N.T.S. at 72.
218. VALTcos, supra note 24, at 44.
219. VArIcOS & VON POTOSKY, supra note 164, at 62. The ILO has supplemented
almost 80 Conventions in this manner. Id.
220. Id.
221. ILO CONST. art. 19(6), 62 Stat. at 3524-26, 15 U.N.T.S. at 72-76; cf. id. art.
19(5), 62 Stat. at 3520-24, 15 U.N.T.S. at 70-72
222. Id., 62 Stat. at 3524-26, 15 U.N.T.S. at 72-76.
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status of the Recommendation, as it pertains to the laws of that
state.223
4. The ILO and Federal Member States
A unique problem arises in regard to the ability of federal
member states, whose jurisdiction over labor matters is subject to
limitations, to ratify and enforce ILO Conventions.224 Where the
authority to regulate labor is dispersed amongst numerous prov-
inces or states, the power to give effect to ILO Conventions may
rest to some extent, not with the federal government, but with
the individual provincial or state governments. 22 5 Consequently,
a federal state that employs a decentralized legal system with re-
spect to labor law is thus powerless to enforce a given Conven-
tion, effectively rendering any ratification vacuous.226
The state of Canada, a member of the ILO since 1919,227 is
a prime example of a federal state unable to give full effect to
Conventions.228 In 1935, Canada enacted legislation with re-
spect to hours of work, minimum wages, and a weekly day of rest,
in compliance with ILO Conventions. 229 The Attorney General
of Ontario, however, challenged the enactment of such legisla-
tion, charging that these actions by the Federal Canadian gov-
ernment were unconstitutional.23 0 The Privy Council of Canada
held that all three bills were ultra vires, as the treaty obligations
involved were not of national concern to Canada.2 3 ' Conse-
quently, the only way that ILO Conventions may gain the force
of law throughout Canada is through both Federal and Provin-
cial ratification and enforcement. 232
223. Id. art. 19(6) (d), 62 Stat. at 3524-26, 15 U.N.T.S. at 74-76.
224. WILLIAM L. TAYLER, FEDERAL STATES AND LABOR TREATIES 90 (1935).
225. E. A. LANDY, THE EFFECTIVENESS OF INTERNATIONAL SUPERVISION, THIRIYYEARS
OF I.L.O. EXPERIENCE 109-10 (1966).
226. Id. at 108-10.
227. LIS OF RATIFICATIONS, supra note 26, at 229.
228. INT'L LABOR LAW COMM. SECTION OF LABOR RELATIONS LAW, Am. BAR ASSOC.,
THE LABOR RELATIONS LAw OF CANADA 20-22 (Richard M. Lyon et al. eds., 1977) [here-
inafter ILLC].
229. Id. at 21.
230. Attorney General of Canada v. Attorney General of Ontario; Reference re
Three Labour Acts, [1937] 1 D.L.R. 673 (P.C.).
231. Id. at 682.
232. Id.; ILO CONST. art. 19(7), 62 Stat. at 3526-30, 15 U.N.T.S. at 76-80. The
Federal Canadian government has very limited powers to regulate labor relations. To-
ronto Electric Commissioners v. Snider, [1925] 2 D.L.R. 5 (Can.). The individual prov-
2054 FORDHAMINTERNATIONALLAWJOURNAL [Vol. 18:2026
The drafters of the ILO Constitution recognized that cer-
tain federal states lacked the legal authority to ratify and imple-
ment Conventions. 3 The U.S. delegates involved with the
drafting of the ILO Constitution expressed concern that the
United States would be powerless to ratify conventions, as labor
legislation was a matter for the then forty-eight states.234 As
many as ten other member states may have been in a position
similar to that of the United States.
235
In order to avoid this problem, the drafters specifically out-
lined the obligations of federal member states with respect to
Conventions and Recommendations. 236 Under Article 19 of the
ILO Constitution, each federal state must present a given Con-
vention or Recommendation to the governments of its various
states or provinces and work with them towards achieving ratifi-
cation and enactment of appropriate legislation. 237 These fed-
eral states are also bound to periodically update the Interna-
tional Labour Office on the status of such Conventions and Rec-
ommendations, as well as on the state of the law and practice in
regard to such Conventions and Recommendations.238
C. The Right to Strike Under the International Labour Organisation
Neither the ILO Constitution nor the numerous Conven-
tions and Recommendations establish an affirmative right to
strike.2 -39 The only instance in which strike activity is mentioned
by name is in the Recommendation concerning Voluntary Con-
inces consequently have the power to adopt or ignore ILO Conventions. See id. (dis-
cussing powers of provinces to regulate labor within their respective boundaries and
limited powers of Dominion Parliament to regulate labor within non-federal areas).
•233. TAYLER, supra note 224, at 63; ILO CONsT. art. 19(7), 62 Stat. at 3526-30, 15
U.N.T.S. at 76-80.
234. TAYLER, supra note 224, at 40, 58. The U.S. government did not begin regu-
lating labor relations on a national level until 1935, with the passage of the Wagner Act.
49 Stat. 449 (1935). The Wagner Act, together with the Taft-Hartley amendments of
1947, the Landrum-Griffin amendments of 1959, and the 1974 amendments, comprise
the National Labor Relations Act. 29 U.S.C. §§ 151-69 (1988).
235. TAYLER, supra note 224, at 58.
236. ILO CONST. art. 19(7), 62 Stat. at 3526-30, 15 U.N.T.S. at 76-80. Federal
states that possess the legal authority to regulate labor matters are bound by the same
obligations as are those members that are not federal states. Id. art. 19(7) (a), 62 Stat. at
3526, 15 U.N.T.S. at 76.
237. Id. art. 19(7) (b) (i), (ii), 62 Stat. at 3526-28, 15 U.N.T.S. at 76-78.
238. Id. art. 19(7) (iii), (iv), (v), 62 Stat. at 3528-30, 15 U.N.T.S. at 78-80.
239. INT'L LABOUR CONVENTIONS & RECOMMENDATIONS, supra note 191, at 3; ILO
CoNST., 62 Stat. at 3490, 15 U.N.T.S. at 40; VALTIcos, supra note 24, at 85.
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ciliation and Arbitration. 2  This Recommendation states that if
a dispute has been submitted to a conciliation procedure with
the consent of both parties, neither strike nor lock-out activity
should occur.2 4 1 The Recommendation further states that this
suggested prohibition should not be construed as limiting in any
way the right to strike. 42 Despite the absence of explicit lan-
guage in its legislative materials, the ILO has, through the CFA
and the Committee of Experts, established in international law a
fundamental right to strike. 43
Since 1952, the CFA has continually held that the right to
strike is an essential and necessary right of trade unions.244 Ac-
cording to the CFA, trade union activity will only fully develop
when the right to strike is protected both in law and practice. 245
Furthermore, under CFA case law, workers must be granted
complete freedom in exercising the right to strike,246 a right that
should only be restricted in exceptional circumstances, and for a
limited duration. 47
240. Recommendation No. 92, Voluntary Conciliation and Arbitration (1951), in
INT'L LABOUR CONVENTIONS & RECOMMENDATIONS, supra note 191, at 207.
241. Id. 1 4, at 207.
242. Id. 1 7, at 207.
243. VALTIcos, supra note 24, at 85-86. The United Nations Covenant on Eco-
nomic, Social and Cultural Rights also establishes the right to strike in international
law, binding signatories to ensure the viability of the right. International Covenant on
Economic, Social and Cultural Rights, Dec. 12, 1966, 993 U.N.T.S. 3, G.A. Res. 2200,
U.N. GAOR, 21st Sess., Supp. No. 16, at 49, U.N. Doc. A/6316 (1966). "The States
Parties to the present Covenant undertake to ensure: ... [t]he right to strike, provided
that it is exercised in conformity with the laws of the particular country." Id. art.
8(1)(d), at 50, 993 U.N.T.S. at 7.
244. Complaint Presented by the World Federation of Trade Unions against the
Government of the United IQngdom, Case No. 28, (Jamaica) (CFA 2d Rep. 1952), te-
printed in SixTH REPORT OF THE INTERNATIONAL LABOUR ORGANISATION TO THE UNITED
NATIONS 167-237 (Geneva, ILO 1952).
245. Complaints Presented by the World Federation of Trade Unions, the World
Confederation of Labour, the International Confederation of Free Trade Unions and
Other Trade Union Organizations Against the Government of Argentina, Case No. 842,
65 INT'L LAB. OFF. OFF'L BULL. 204 (CFA 219th Rep. 1982). "[T]rade union activity can
only develop fully and in complete freedom when the right to strike and the right to
bargain collectively at the global level are recognised in law and in practice." Id. at 209.
246. Id. at 212.
247. Id. at 209. "The Committee has recognised that strikes may be restricted, and
even prohibited, in the public service, essential services, or a key centre of a country's
economy because - and to the extent that - a work stoppage may cause serious harm
to the national community." Complaint Presented by the Canadian Labour Congress
and the Canadian Association of University Teachers Against the Government of Can-
ada, Case No. 893, 62 INT'L LAB. OFF. OFF'L BULL. 22, 28 (CFA 194th Rep. 1979).
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The CFA has grounded its decisions that a fundamental
right to strike exists under international law on a plain meaning
interpretation of Articles 3 and 10 of Convention 87.248 Conven-
tion 87 grants workers the right to organize their activities and to
formulate their programmes, free from any interference by the
public authorities. 49 Workers are also guaranteed the right to
join trade union organizations whose purpose is to further and
defend the interests of its members. ° Consequently, the ILO
has, through the CFA, announced that workers possess an af-
firmative right to strike in defending and promoting their eco-
nomic interests. 5'
While the ILO recognizes and affirms a worker's right to
strike, the Organisation does not believe that the right is an end
in itself.252 Rather, strike action should be understood as a last
resort for workers' organizations in pursuing their economic
goals.253 The Committee of Experts notes that while strikes may
be expensive and disruptive for all parties involved, including
the general public, they are an essential feature of industrial re-
lations and the collective bargaining process.254
1. Permissible Restrictions on the Right to Strike
The Committee has emphasized that while the ability to
248. Canada, 62 INT'L LAB. OFF. OFF'L BULL. at 28.
Under Article 3 of Convention No. 87, trade union organisations - as or-
ganisations of workers furthering and defending their occupational interests
(Article 10) - have the right to formulate their programmes and organise
their activities. It is on the basis of the right which trade unions are thus
recognised as possessing that the Committee has always considered the right
to strike as a legitimate - and indeed essential - means by which workers
may defend their organisational interests.
Id.
249. Convention 87, art. 3, supra note 191, at 4-5.
250. Id. art. 10, at 5.
251. Complaints Presented by the United Trade Unions of Casablanca (Moroccan
Union of Labour) Against the Government of Morocco, Cases Nos. 992 & 1018, 65
INT'L LAB. OFF. OFF'L BuLL. 17, 20 (CFA 214th Rep. 1982). "[T]he right to strike con-
stitutes one of the essential means which workers and workers' organisations must have
at their disposal in order to promote and defend their occupational interests." Id.
252. COMMITTEE OF EXPERTS ON THE APPLICATION OF CONVENTIONS AND RECOMMEN-
DATIONS, REPORT ON FREEDOM OF ASSOCATION AND COLLECTIVE BARGANING 61 (1994)
[hereinafter COMMITrEE OF EXPERTS].
253. Id.
254. Id. "Strikes are expensive and disruptive for workers, employers and society
and when they occur they are due to a failure in the process of fixing working condi-
tions through collective bargaining which should remain the final objective." Id.
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strike is a fundamental right, governments may restrict or condi-
tion the exercise of that right. 55 Generally, complete prohibi-
tions on strikes are permissible only in rare circumstances such
as during a natural disaster or war. 56 One area, however, in
which the ILO has approved the use of a permanent ban is in
what may be called essential services, those whose interruption
would imperil the safety or health of society. 57 Additionally,
member states may prevent public servants from striking, if those
servants exercise authority in the name of the state, or if a pro-
longed work stoppage would acutely affect the public.25 8
The Committee further recognizes the legitimacy of legisla-
tion that prohibits both strikes and lockouts during the life of a
collective bargaining agreement. 25 9 Laws permitting strike activ-
ity only as a means to facilitate the adoption of an initial agree-
ment or its renewal are compatible with the ILO, providing that
workers and employers are afforded access to some form of a
conciliation system. 2  Essentially, the Committee of Experts has
concluded that a government may restrict the right to strike pro-
vided that the restrictions do not seriously impair the exercise of
the right, and thus limit the means available to workers for fur-
thering their interests.261
D. The Right to Hire Replacement Workers Under the International
Labour Organisation
Convention 98 secures a powerful check against over-reach-
ing restrictions levied upon the right to strike,2 62 prohibiting an
255. Id. at 67.
256. Id. During such a national crisis, the prohibition may only be implemented
for a limited time and only to the extent necessary to overcome the situation. Id.
257. Id. at 70. "[T]he Committee therefore considers that essential services are
only those the interruption of which would endanger the life, personal safety or health
of the whole or part of the population." Id. The Committee believes that it is not
possible to categorize exactly what services do or do not fall into this definition, due to
unique and special circumstances that exist in the various member states. Id.
258. Id.
259. Id. at 73. One such example of legislation that prohibits strikes and lockouts
during the life of a collective bargaining agreement is the Ontario Labour Relations
Act. The Labour Relations Act, R.S.O., ch. 21, § 74(1) (1992) (Can.).
260. Id.
261. Id. at 66-67.
262. See INT'L LABOUR CONVErToNs & RECOMMENDATIONS, supra note 191, at 7.
Convention 98 forbids an employer from discriminating against employees for partici-
pating or engaging in union activities. Id.
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employer from discriminating against employees who engage in
union activities.263 The Committee on Freedom of Association
has held that an employer's refusal to reinstate employees, who
have exercised their right to strike, is a violation of Convention
98.211 Such a denial of reinstatement, following the conclusion
of a lawful strike, amounts to unlawful anti-union discrimina-
tion.26
5
In July 1990, the American Federation of Labor and Con-
gress of Industrial Organizations ("AFL-CIO") filed a complaint
with the CFA against the U.S. government, alleging that U.S. law
violated employees' rights to freedom of association, by allowing
for the permanent replacement of workers engaged in a lawful
economic strike.266 The AFL-CIO directly challenged the rule
set forth in Mackay Radio,267 granting employers the right to hire
replacements.2 68 Arguing that there is often no difference be-
tween discharge and the permanent replacement of strikers ,269
the AFL-CIO emphasized that the effect of both is to leave the
lawfully striking employee without a job.2
The U.S. government responded to the complaint, asserting
that the replacement worker doctrine is a long-time component
of U.S. labor law that balances the rights and interests of workers
and employers.271 The United States explained the legal distinc-
tion between permanently replaced workers and discharged
263. Id.; COMMITTEE ON FREEDOM OF ASSOCIATION, DIGEST OF DECISIONS AND PRINCI-
PLES 85 (1985).
264. COMMITTEE ON FREEDOM OF ASSOCIATION, supra note 263, at 7. When an em-
ployer dismisses unionists for engaging in a lawful strike, "the Committee can only con-
clude that they have been punished for their trade union activities and have been dis-
criminated against contrary to Article I of Convention No. 98." Id.
265. Id. "The use of extremely serious measures, such as dismissal of workers for
having participated in a strike and refusal to re-employ them, implies a serious risk of
abuse and constitutes a violation of freedom of association." Id.
266. Complaint Against the Government of the United States Presented by the
American Federation of Labor and Congress of Industrial Organizations (AFL-CIO),
Case No. 1543, 74 INrr'L LaB. OFF. OFF'L BuLL. 15 (CFA 278th Rep. 1991). "The AFL-
CIO alleges in substance that the United States labor law and jurisprudence allow for
the permanent replacement of workers engaging in lawful economic strikes, which
gives rise to violations of freedom of association, and of the rights to organise and col-
lective bargaining." Id.
267. NLRB v. Mackay Radio & Telegraph Co., 304 U.S. 333 (1938).
268. United States, 74 INr'L LAB. OFF. OFF'L BuLL. at 15.
269. Id.
270. Id. at 16.
271. Id. at 18.
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workers, stressing that the former remain employees under Sec-
tion 2(3) of the NLRA, possessing preferential reinstatement
rights if and when a position becomes available. 72 While ac-
knowledging the importance of a worker's right to strike, the
U.S. Government argued that employers' possess a counter-
vailing right to maintain operations during a labor dispute. 73
Accordingly, the United States opined that the lure of a perma-
nent position is the only way a struck employer is able to recruit
replacement workers and thereby maintain operations.274 The
U.S. government, however, did not substantiate this claim with
any data, reports, or other forms of proof.2 7
5
Prior to rendering a decision, the CFA reaffirmed that the
right to strike is an essential means through which workers and
their organizations may promote and defend their economic in-
terests. 76 The Committee concluded that U.S. law does not ac-
tually guarantee this basic right because a worker who legally ex-
ercises the right to strike may lawfully be permanently re-
placed. 77 Consequently, the practice in the United States of
272. Id. at 20.
In the absence of a determination that the employer has engaged in an unfair
labor practice (which converts the economic strike to an unfair labor practice
strike), the employer is not required immediately to reinstate economic strik-
ers at the conclusion of the strike. Even if replaced, under United States law,
economic strikers retain their status as employees and are entitled to preferen-
tial reinstatement. Section 2(3) of the NLRA provides that the term 'em-
ployee" includes "any individual whose work has ceased as a consequence of,
or in connection with, any current labor dispute or because of any unfair labor
practice, and who has not obtained any regular and substantially equivalent
employment ....
Id..
273. United States, 74 INrr'L LAB. OFF. OFF 'L BULL. at 24. "The most potent measure
that workers have is the right to strike. Employers have the countervailing right to
continue operations in spite of a strike." Id.
274. Id. at 21.
It is an economic fact that employers may not be able to continue operations
during a strike unless they hire replacement workers. Moreover, workers with
the requisite skills are often unwilling to take only a temporary job, or to cross
a union picket line for less than an offer or permanent employment.
Id. "Employers, therefore, have a substantial business need for having the option to
offer permanent positions to replacement workers." Id. at 24.
275. Id. at 18-25.
276. Id. at 27.
277. Id.
The Committee considers that this basic right is not really guaranteed when a
worker who exercises it legally runs the risk of seeing his or her job taken up
permanently by another workerjust as legally. The Committee considers that,
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permanently replacing lawfully striking employees entails a dero-
gation of the right to strike that may affect the free exercise of
trade union rights. 2 8 The CFA urged the U.S. government to
consider this derogation and the harmful effects that it may have
upon workers exercising their right of freedom of association.2 79
At its 1991 annual meeting, the Governing Body of the ILO
adopted the conclusions of the CFA, criticizing U.S. policy re-
garding the permanent replacement of workers.2 80 Three years
later, at the Eighty-First Session of the International Labour Con-
ference, the Committee of Experts reported that the right to
strike may be devoid of content if lawfully striking workers can-
not obtain their reinstatement once the strike ends.2 8 1 The
Committee concluded that the right to strike is critically
demeaned when the law of the land sanctions an employer's de-
cision to permanently replace striking workers.282
II. LABOR'S RIGHT TO STRIKE AND MANAGEMENT'S RIGHT
TO HIRE REPLACEMENT WORKERS UNDER THE LAWS OF
ONTARIO, CANADA AND TILE UNITED STATES
Both Canada and the United States are federal states, coun-
tries containing numerous provinces285 or states, united under
one central federal government.284 Significantly, under a fed-
ifa strike is otherwise legal, the use of labour drawn from outside the undertak-
ing to replace strikers for an indeterminate period entails a risk of derogation
from the right to strike which may affect the free exercise of trade union
rights.
Id. (emphasis added).
278. Id.
279. Id.
280. ILO Body Questions US. Polic
, 
supra note 182, at A-6.
281. CoMMrrrEE OF EXPERTS, sup=a note 252, at 62.
282. Id. at 76-77.
A special problem arises when legislation or practice allows enterprises to re-
cruit workers to replace their own employees on legal strike. The difficulty is
even more serious if, under legislative provisions or case-law, strikers do not, as
of right, find their job waiting for them at the end of the dispute. The Com-
mittee considers that this type of provision or practice seriously impairs the
right to strike an affects the free exercise of trade union rights.
Id. "Since the maintaining of the employment relationship is a normal consequence of
recognition of the right to strike, its exercise should not result in workers being dis-
missed or discriminated against." Id. at 78.
283. See H.W. ARTHURS ET AL., LABOUR LAW AND INDUSTRIAL RELATIONS IN CANADA
23 (3d ed. 1988). Canada is a federal state, comprised of ten provinces and two territo-
ries. Id.
284. ILLC, supra note 228, at 17-27.
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eral scheme, the states or provinces2 85 retain powers, separate
and distinct from the federal government.28 6 In the field of la-
bor law, this separation of powers is of much greater conse-
quence in Canada, where approximately ninety percent of the
nation's work force is regulated by the labor laws of the individ-
2817ual provinces. Conversely, through the U.S. Supreme Court
decision in NLRB v. Jones & Laughlin Steel Corp.,288 only about
ten percent of all U.S. workers are now covered by state labor
law.2 19 Thus, while labor law in the United States is for the most
part a federal issue, it is provincial law that primarily governs
labor relations in Canada.290
A. The Right to Strike in Ontario, Canada
Under the British North America Act of 1867,291 each prov-
ince is vested with the powers to regulate local works, property,
and civil rights in the province, and all affairs of a local or private
29nature. 92 Since the 1925 landmark case, Toronto Electric Commis-
sioners v. Snider,293 the Canadian courts have held that the prov-
inces have exclusive jurisdiction to regulate labor relations
within their boundaries.2 94 The Federal Canadian government
retains limited authority over labor relations, regulating the fed-
285. Id. at 19. The two Canadian territories, the Northwest territories and the
Yukon Territory, fall under federal jurisdiction. Id. The 10 provinces that have their
own set of labor laws are Alberta, British Columbia, Manitoba, New Brunswick, New-
foundland, Nova Scotia, Ontario, Prince Edward Island, Quebec, and Saskatchewan.
Id. at 112-19.
286. Id.
287. Id. at 18.
288. 301 U.S. 1 (1937). The Court held that the Congress has, through its com-
merce powers, the authority to regulate labor relations and enact a national scheme of
labor law. Id. at 30-43. The Court further held that Congress may regulate activities
that affect interstate commerce. Id. These regulatory powers derive from the Com-
merce Clause in the U.S. Constitution. Id. at 37; U.S. CONST. art. I, § 8.
289. ILLC, supra note 228, at 18.
290. Id. at 17-22.
291. British North America Act, 1867, 30 & 31 Vict. c. 3 (U.K.).
292. Id. §§ 92(10), (13), (16).
293. [1925] 2 D.L.R. 5 (Can.). At issue was the Industrial Disputes Investigation
Act, which granted the Federal Canadian government the authority to regulate labor
disputes throughout the Federal Territories and the Provinces. Id. at 6. The Privy
Council held that the Act was ultra vires. Id. at 9. The Privy Council stated that
"[w]hatever else may be the effect of this enactment, it is clear that it is one which could
have been passed, so far as any Province is concerned, by the Provincial Legislature
under the powers conferred by § 92 of the B.NA Act." Id. at 8.
294. ILLC, supra note 228, at 20.
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eral territories, matters involving interprovincial and interna-
tional transportation and communication, and other matters
that are deemed to be for the general benefit of Canada or for
the benefit of two or more of the provinces.295
Scholars have recognized the indeterminate juridical nature
of the right to strike.2 96 The Ontario Labour Relations Act (or
"Ontario Act") does not explicitly state that workers have the
right to strike.297 A general right to strike, however, does ex-
ist.298 The legal right to strike derives from both the absence of
common law decisions denying its existence, 299 and from the im-
plicit language in various sections of the Ontario Act, that delin-
eate the boundaries of the right and the restrictions that may be
levied upon it.300 For example, Section 1 of the Ontario Act de-
fines various labor law terms of art, including "strike." °3 1  Sec-
tions 74 and 76 of the Ontario Act respectively articulate when
an employee may go on strike, 0 2 and what constitutes an unlaw-
ful strike. 03 Thus, despite the absence of affirmative statutory
language, the right to strike is embedded in the Ontario Labour
Relations Act.30 4
1. Unlawful Strikes Under Ontario Law
The Ontario Act imposes a general prohibition on strikes
during the period in which a collective agreement30 5 is in af-
295. Id. at 19.
296. ARTHURS ET AL., supra note 283, at 256.
297. The Labour Relations Act, R.S.O., ch. 21 (1992) (Can.).
298. ARTHURS ET AL., supra note 283, at 257.
299. Id. at 256-57.
300. Id.; see, e.g., R.S.O., ch. 21, §§ 1, 41(l.2)(a), 73.1 (1992) (Can.) (discussing
when strike activity may or may not occur).
301. R.S.O., ch. 21, § 1 (1992). A strike includes a cessation of work, a refusal to
work or to continue to work by employees in combination or in concert or in accord-
ance with a common understanding, or a slow-down or other concerted activity on the
part of employees designed to restrict or limit output. Id.
302. Id. § 74:
303. Id. § 76.
304. See, e.g., id. §§ 1, 41(1.2) (a), 73.1 (discussing when strike activity may or may
not occur).
305. See id. § 1. A collective agreement, analogous to the U.S. collective bargain-
ing agreement, is defined as follows:
An agreement in writing between an employer or an employers' organization,
on the one hand, and a trade union or council of trade unions that, represents
employees of the employer, or employees of members of the employers' or-
ganization, on the other hand, containing provisions respecting terms or con-
1995] REPLACEMENT PLAYERS FOR TORONTO BLUEJAYS? 2063
fect.30  Any employee who is bound by such an agreement and
who partakes in a strike will have engaged in an unlawful
strike. 07 Additionally, no union shall call for, authorize, or
threaten to call or authorize an unlawful strike, and no officer,
agent, official, or council of a union shall encourage, support, or
procure an unlawful strike 80 ' The law further provides that no
employee shall threaten to engage in an unlawful strike.309
2. Legal Strikes Under Ontario Law
Where a collective agreement is not in operation, certain
procedural requirements must be satisfied before an employee
may engage in a lawful strike.310 In furtherance of the Ontario
Act's stated purposes, to promote harmonious labor relations,
industrial stability, and the ongoing settlement of differences be-
tween employers and trade unions,311 all strike activity is pro-
scribed until the Minister of Labour312 has appointed a concilia-
tion officer or mediator.1 3 Following such an appointment, the
employees may lawfully strike seven days subsequent to the Min-
ister releasing the report of the mediator or conciliation of-
ficer.3 14 If, however, the Minister concludes that it would not be
advisable to appoint a conciliation board, the employees may
ditions of employment or the rights, privileges or duties of the employer, em-
ployers' organization, the trade union or the employees, and includes a pro-
vincial agreement.
Id.
306. Id. § 74(1).
307. Id. The quid pro quo in the Ontario Act, for the prohibition against workers
going on strike while a CRA is in effect is the additional prohibition that an employer
not lock out the employees. Id. A lockout is defined as follows:
The closing of a place of employment, a suspension of work or an employer's
refusal to continue to employ a number of employees, with a view to compel
or induce the employees, or to aid another employer to compel or induce that
employer's employees, to refrain from exercising any rights or privileges
under this Act, or to agree to provisions or changes in provisions respecting
terms or conditions of employment or the rights, privileges or duties of the
employer, an employers' organization, the union, or the employees.
Is § 1.
308. Id. § 76.
309. Id. § 74(3).
310. Id. § 74(2)-(6).
311. Id. § 2.1(3).
312. Id. § 74. The specific language of Section 74 refers only to "the Minister." Id.
Section 1, however, states that Minister is to mean Minister of Labour. Id. § 1.
313. Id. § 74(2).
314. Id. § 74(2)(a).
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strike fourteen days after receiving such notification from the
Minister. 15
Once these procedural requirements have been met, all
members of the relevant bargaining unit 16 must be afforded an
opportunity to vote, either for or against the decision to strike. 17
In addition, a strike vote conducted by a union must be done by
secret ballot, so as to ensure that each individual cannot be iden-
tified with his or her vote."' Lastly, the union must give suffi-
cient notice of the scheduled vote so that all those eligible to
vote have an ample opportunity to cast their ballots.3 19
B. The Right to Hire Replacement Workers in Ontario, Canada
Included among the purposes of the Ontario Labour Rela-
tions Act are the promotion of harmonious labor relations and
the encouragement of the collective bargaining process, so as to
enhance the ability of employees to negotiate terms and condi-
tions of employment with their employer.3 2 0 These purposes,
coupled with the Ontario Act's conciliatory nature,321 highlight a
strong preference in the law for employers and workers to ex-
haust all other avenues of negotiation and dispute resolution
before resorting to a strike or lockout.3 22 Once, however, a
union or group of employees fulfill the requisite statutory crite-
ria and subsequently elect to exercise their right to strike, Onta-
rio law guarantees that the right will not be vacuous, by proscrib-
ing the hiring of replacement workers.32 3
1. The Statutory Ban on Hiring Replacement Workers
Section 73 of the Ontario Act provides that no employer or
person acting on behalf of an employer or employers' Organiza-
tion shall engage in strike-related misconduct or retain the serv-
315. Id. 874(2)(b).
316. Id. § 1. A bargaining unit is a unit of employees appropriate for collective
bargaining, whether it is an employer unit or a plant unit or a subdivision of either of
them. Id.
317. Id. 8 74(5).
318. Id. 8 74(4).
319. Id. § 74(6).
320. Id. § 2(2).
321. Id. § 74.
322. Id.
323. Id. §§ 73-73.1.
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ices of a professional strike breaker.A24 A professional strike
breaker is defined as one who is not involved in the relevant
dispute and whose primary object is to interfere with the exer-
cise of any right under the Ontario Act in anticipation of, or
during, a lawful strike or lock-out.3 2 1 Similarly, strike related
misconduct includes a course of conduct intended to interfere
with, obstruct, or disrupt the exercise of a right contained in the
Ontario Act in anticipation of, or during, a lawful strike. 26
In 1983, the Ontario Labour Relations Board3 27 ("OLRB")
decided United Steelworkers of America v. Securicor Investigation &
Security Ltd., 28 a case that illustrates the targeted behavior that
the Ontario Act proscribes.329 Securicor involved a third party se-
curity company that was not a party to the collective agree-
ment.330 At the request of the struck employer, Securicor dis-
patched an agent to pose as a striking employee and incite vio-
lence and unlawful conduct.3 31 The OLRB held this conduct to
be unlawful and imposed damages upon the third party com-
pany.3 3 2
In 1992, Ontario's New Democratic Party ("NDP") govern-
ment amended the Labour Relations Act,3 33 enacting Section
73.1, which proscribes the use of replacement workers during
any lock-out or lawful strike. 3 4 In accord with the conciliatory
nature of the Ontario Act, a union must first abide by certain
procedural requirements before an employer will be bound by
324. Id. § 73(1). The Ontario Act specifically states that "no person, employer, em-
ployers' organization or person acting on behalf of an employer or employers' organi-
zation shall engage in strike-related misconduct or retain the services of a professional
strike breaker." Id.
325. Id. § 73(2).
326. Id.
327. Id. §§ 102-10. The OLRB has the power to adjudicate all matters relating to
the certification or decertification of a union to represent a unit of employees, and to
resolve any conflicts arising over a labor agreement. Id.
328. [1983] O.L.R.B. Rep. 720.
329. Id. at 749-54.
330. Id. at 721, 749-50.
331. Id. at 750-51.
332. Id. at 761-62.
333. Jerry Cook, Bill 40 Puts the Brakes on Auto Sector; Ontario's Labor Law Reform,
CAN. MACH. & METALWORKNG, Jan. 1993, at 28 [hereinafter Bill 40 Puts the Brakes on
Auto Sector].
334. R.S.O., ch. 21, § 73.1 (1992). This section came into effect on January 1,
1993. Bill 40 Puts the Brakes on Auto Sector, supra note 333, at 28.
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the prohibition.335 These requirements focus on the way in
which a strike is authorized, mandating that: a) employees take
a strike vote only after notice of a desire to bargain is given, or
after bargaining has in fact begun;336 b) the strike vote be con-
ducted by way of secret ballot, with ample opportunity to cast a
ballot afforded to all those eligible;33 7 and c) at least sixty per-
cent of those voting authorize the strike. 38
Once a bargaining unit goes on strike, in accordance with
the above listed procedures, an employer may not utilize the
services of an employee in that unit, even if that employee wants
to work.3 3 9 The Ontario Act does permit employers to deploy
managerial or confidential employees3 40 to perform work that is
ordinarily conducted by those on strike.3 4 1 Employers, however,
may not hire persons, 42 nor may they transfer employees to a
place of operations3 43 to perform the work of the bargaining
unit that is on strike. 34 4 Furthermore, if a managerial or confi-
dential employee is performing the work of striking workers, the
struck employer may not hire persons to perform the work nor-
mally engaged in by that managerial or confidential em-
ployee.3 45
2. Exceptions to the Ban on Replacement Workers
While Ontario law embodies a general prohibition against
the use of strikebreakers and replacement workers,346 the law
also recognizes that there are times when the benefits of a ban
on replacement workers are outweighed by other fundamental
335. R.S.O., ch. 21, § 73.1(2) (1992).
336. Id. § 73.1(2.1).
337. Id. § 73.1(2.2).
338. Id. § 73.1(2.3).
339. Id. § 73.1(4).
340. Id. § 73.1(1) (a). A managerial employee is a person who exercises manage-
rial functions; a confidential employee is a person employed in a confidential capacity
in matters relating to labor relations. Id.
341. Id. § 73.1(6).
342. Id. § 73.1(5).
343. Id. § 73.1 (1). Place of operations is defined as any place where employees in
the bargaining unit who are on strike, or who are locked out, would ordinarily perform
their work. Id.
344. Id. § 73.1(6).
345. Id. § 73.1(5).
346. Id. §§ 73-73.1.
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concerns.3 4 7 Therefore, the Ontario Act allows an employer,
who is the target of a lawful strike, to hire replacement workers
to the extent necessary to provide certain health care-related
and emergency services . 48 Further protecting the welfare of the
general public, employers may lawfully hire replacement workers
to the extent that the employer needs them in order to prevent:
a) danger to life, health, or safety; b) the destruction or serious
deterioration of equipment or property; or c) grave environmen-
tal damage.'
Before replacement workers may be hired to perform the
work described in Sections 73.2(2) and 73.2(3), the Ontario Act
requires that the employer notify the union of the type of work
to be performed and the number of workers needed to com-
plete the job.35 ° In an emergency situation, an employer shall
notify the union, at the earliest possible time, that circumstances
necessitate the use of replacement workers.3"' Following notifi-
cation, a union may allow the employer to use bargaining unit
employees to perform the required work under Sections 73.2(2)
and 73.2 (3).s52 Each union has the option to consent to the use
of striking workers to perform this emergency work.3 53 Employ-
ers, however, must adhere to the union's decision. 35 4
3. The Legal Significance of Prohibiting Replacement Workers
A consequential by-product of Ontario's ban on the use of
replacement workers is that striking workers are guaranteed
their jobs once the strike ends, 5 5 subject to a few narrow excep-
tions.35 6 In furtherance of the Ontario Act's purpose to promote
347. Id. § 73.2.
348. Id. § 73.2(2). The Ontario Act allow replacements to be used to provide the
following services: the custody or detention of persons; residential care, for children
who are in need of protection, or for persons with behavioral or emotional problems or
with a physical, mental or developmental handicap; emergency shelter or crisis inter-
vention services and emergency dispatch communications services, ambulance services,
or a first aid clinic. Id.
349. Id. § 73.2(3).
350. Id. § 73.2(4).
351. Id. § 73.2(6).
352. Id. § 73.2(7).
353. Id.
354. Id. § 73.2(8).
355. Id. § 75(2).
356. Id. § 75.
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effective, fair, and expeditious methods of dispute resolution, 7
the parties are encouraged to agree to terms regarding the rein-
statement of the striking employees.35 8 If, however, an agree-
ment cannot be reached, the parties are bound to follow the
guidelines set forth in the Ontario Act.a
59
Following the conclusion of a strike, each striking employee
is entitled to his or her former position. 60 If there are not
enough positions available for all returning employees, the posi-
tions shall be filled as work becomes available.36 1 The employer
must initially look to the collective agreement for any provisions
relating to the reinstatement of workers.3 62 If the agreement
contains recall provisions based on seniority, as determined
when the strike began, then the employer shall recall workers
accordingly.363 In the absence of such a provision, the employer
shall reinstate workers according to their length of service, which
is also to be determined as of the time the strike began. 64
In general, employees who are either on strike or locked
out are entitled to displace any persons who were performing
the work of striking or locked-out employees during the labor
dispute.3 65 A striking employee, however, is not entitled to dis-
place another employee in the bargaining unit who performed
work during the strike, pursuant to Section 73.2, and whose
length of service is now greater.3 66 While this exception could
potentially infringe on a striking worker's right to return to his
or her job, it is only applicable if employees are being recalled
under Section 75(4) (b). 67
4. The Controversy Over the Statutory Ban on
Replacement Workers
Prior to january 1, 1993, an employer could discharge and
permanently replace workers that engaged in a strike for six
357. Id. § 2.1(4).
358. Id. § 75(1).
359. Id.
360. Id. § 75(2).
361. Id. § 75(4).
362. Id. § 75(4)(a).
363. Id.
364. Id. § 75(4) (b).
365. Id. § 75(3).
366. Id.
367. Id.
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months or more.3 68 The former Ontario law guaranteed striking
employees a limited right of reinstatement, which they could
only exercise within the initial six months of the strike, if they
tendered to their employer an unconditional offer to return to
work.369 Once such an offer had been made, an employer could
not deny reinstatement unless that employer had completely
eliminated the positions that those workers previously occu-
pied. 7 ° If an employer had temporarily suspended or discontin-
ued certain operations, that employer was obligated to offer po-
sitions to the former employees, once such operations were re-
sumed.3 7 1
In 1992, however, the NDP government amended Ontario's
Labour Relations Act,37 2 prohibiting the use of replacement
workers.3 73 Ontario Labour Minister Bob Mackenzie stated that
the new legislation would increase labor-management co-opera-
tion as well as improve productivity.3 74 Through the amend-
ments, the NDP government hoped to encourage partnerships
between employees and employers that would augment the Prov-
ince's stability.3 75
Numerous business groups, however, were adamantly op-
posed to the legislation, believing that it granted unions a potent
368. Bill 40 Puts the Brakes on Auto Sector, supra note 333, at 28; R.S.O. ch. 228,
§ 73(1) (1980) (Can.).
Where an employee engaging in a lawful strike makes an unconditional appli-
cation in writing to his employer within six months from the commencement
of the lawful strike to return to work, the employer must, subject to § 73(2) of
the Labour Relations Act, reinstate the employee in his former employment,
on such terms as the employer and the employee may agree upon, and the
employer in offering terms of employment shall not discriminate against the
employee by reason of his exercising any rights under the Labour Relations
Act.
Id.
369. R.S.O. ch. 228, § 73(1) (1980) (Can.).
370. Id. § 73(2).
371. Id. "[flf the employer resumes such operations, the employer is to first rein-
state those employees who have made an application under § 73(1) of the Labour Rela-
tions Act." Id.
372. Bill 40 Puts The Brakes On Auto Sector, supra note 333, at 28.
373. Id.
374. Leslie Papp, Job Creator orJob Killer? Unions, Business at Opposite Ends on Effects
of Planned Labor Reforms, ToRoNTo STAR, Apr. 1, 1992, at A19 [hereinafter Job Creator or
Job Killer?]. "If these proposals become law they will contribute significantly to the eco-
nomic renewal of the province." Id.
375. Desmond Bill, Business Says It's Ted Up' with Rae, ToRoNro STAR, Apr. 3, 1992,
at Al [hereinafter Business Fed Up].
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and deleterious economic weapon. 76 Consequently, these
groups waged vigorous propaganda campaigns against the
amendments.5" The Motor Vehicle Manufacturers Association
argued that the ban on replacement workers would cripple the
industry, costing upwards of C$10,000,000378 The Coalition to
Keep Ontario Working, another pro-business lobby, spent
C$700,000 on advertisements, alleging that the proposed
changes in the law, if enacted, would cost Ontario 295,000
jobs3 79 and drive away investors.5 8 0 The business alliance Project
Economic Growth ("PEG"), comprised of such major corpora-
tions as IBM, General Motors, and Sears, 81  initiated a
C$1,000,000 campaign in an attempt to defeat the proposals.112
PEG also hired the U.S.-based lobbyist Hill and Knowlton, the
firm that orchestrated favorable public sentiment in the United
States during the Gulf War against Iraq, to direct the cam-
paign.83
During the first year in which the Ontario Act prohibited
employers from hiring replacement workers, the Labour Minis-
try reported that strike activity declined more than forty percent
as compared to the previous year. 84 Contrary to what business
leaders had espoused, the number of strikes in Ontario fell from
116 to 67, resulting in a net gain of over 350,000 work days. 85 In
addition, during the first three quarters of 1993 unions negoti-
376. Leslie Papp, $700,000 Campaign Attacks Labor Bill, TORONTO STAR, Sept. 25,
1992, at Al [hereinafter $700,000 Campaign].
377. Id.
378. Rob Wilson, The Week in Review: Feb. 3 -Feb. 7, FIN. PosT, Feb. 10, 1992, § 1, at
2.
379. $700,000 Campaign, supra note 376, at Al. The campaign slogan was entitled
"[k] ill the bill before it kills yourjob." Id. One of the advertisements stated the follow-
ing: "[t]he NDP has a debt to pay to union bosses - and it's paying with yourjob." Id.
380. Leslie Papp, Ban On Strikebreakers Paying off for Unions Warnings of Mass Job
Losses Failed To Materialize, TORONTO STAR, Dec. 19, 1993, at El 1 (hereinafter Ban Paying
Off].
381. Thomas Walkom, Business Teams up To Fight Rae's Labor Reforms, TORONTO
STAR, Feb. 22, 1992, at D5. Pepsico Inc., Ford, Chrysler, Imperial Oil, McDonald's, and
Honda also contributed to this lobbying effort. Id.
. 382. Id. A separate business lobby, More Jobs Coalition, employed C$200,000 in
an effort to defeat the proposed legislation. Id.
383. Id. Another lobby ran a C$150,000 campaign labelling Ontario's Premier
Bob Rae "Buffalo Business Boosters Man of the Year for economic policies 'that are
drivingjobs and investment out of Ontario.' " Matt Maychak, Group's Ads Take Satiric Jab
at Premier, TORONTO STAR, Mar. 17, 1992, at A1O.
384. Ban Paying off, supra note 380, at Ell.
385. Id. From January 1, 1992 through October 1992, Ontario suffered 525,030
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ated an average wage increase of nine one-thousandths percent,
a record low.3 86 Ontario also experienced a rise in unionization,
with 739 applications for union certification submitted to the
Ontario Labour Relations Board in 1993, an increase of twenty-
four percent from 1992.387
While labor and business leaders argued over whether the
figures for 1993 were a product of the changed law or of the
recession,38 8 one discernible effect of the law was a rush for legal
advice on the part of employers.3 89 In 1993, the Toronto office
of Baker & McKenzie, a law firm, received numerous requests
from Ontario businesses on how to handle labor relations under
the new law.3 90 Baker & McKenzie advised businesses to make
sure they treated their workers fairly, paid competitive wages,
and offered a safe, non-discriminatory work environment.
39 1
Since January 1, 1993, five percent of all labor negotiations have
resulted in strikes, the same rate as before the NDP government
enacted the ban on replacements.
3 92
C. The Right to Strike in the United States?
93
Subject to certain limitations, the National Labor Relations
Act3 94 (or "NLRA" or "Act") grants employees the affirmative
legal right to strike, regardless of whether a collective bargaining
lost person days. Id. During the same period in 1993, there were 164,670 lost person
days in Ontario as a result of strike activity. Id.
386. Id.
387. Id. In 1992, there were 595 applications submitted by unions for certification.
Id.
388. Id.
389. Leslie Papp, Labor Reforms Create Jobs -for Lawyers Consultants Cash in as Busi-
ness Leaders Scramble for Advice, TORONTO STAR, Feb. 15, 1993, at A2.
390. Id. During the first month in which the ban on replacements was in effect,
the firm received 22 new business clients, each seeking advice regarding the new law.
Id.
391. Id. Specifically, the firm advised businesses to set up internal grievance pro-
cedures, inform workers of all company policies, and to consider giving workers some
extra benefits, "some of which cost the employer little or nothing." Id.
392. Telephone Interview with Patti Hannigan, Policy Adviser, Ontario Ministry of
Labour (Feb. 28, 1995).
393. 29 U.S.C. §§ 151-69 (1988). For the purposes of this Note, the right to strike
and the right to hire replacement workers in the United States will only be discussed in
relation to the National Labor Relations Act, which is the primary body of labor
legislation. Id. This Note will not discuss the Railway Labor Act, which regulates labor
relations involving common carriers. 45 U.S.C. §§ 151-88 (1988).
394. 29 U.S.C. §§ 151-69.
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agreement is in force. 95 Section 13 expressly states that nothing
in the Act, except as specifically provided for, shall be construed
so as either to interfere with, diminish, or impede in any way the
right to strike.3 96 Employees are also guaranteed the right to en-
gage in concerted activities for the purposes of collective bar-
gaining or other mutual aid or protection. 97 Thus, while
neither the common law nor the U.S. Constitution confers the
absolute right to strike, 9" the U.S. Congress has established that
workers in fact have such a right.399
Rooted in the legal sanctioning of peaceful work stoppages
is the belief that the strike, or the fear of a strike, is the driving
force behind the collective bargaining process.4 °0 When labor
negotiations reach a firm point of disagreement, both the em-
ployees' bargaining representative and the employer have to
choose between a compromise or a strike."° According to
Harvard University Professor of Law, Archibald Cox, collective
bargaining works because eventually both sides conclude that
the risks of losses through a strike are so great that compromise
is cheaper than economic warfare.40 2 While parties sometimes
choose to risk the economic uncertainties of a strike, the dispute
will eventually settle when at least one side is convinced that con-
tinuing the struggle will cost more than acceptance of the adver-
sary's terms.
1. Lawful Economic and Unfair Labor Practice Strikes
Under the NLRA, employees' strikes are either economic or
unfair labor practice strikes. °4 The cause of a strike determines
its character."° An unfair labor practice strike occurs where an
employer's violation of the labor laws is a contributing cause of
395. NLRB v. Insurance Agents' International Union, 361 U.S. 477 (holding that
employees may lawfully exert various forms of economic pressure including strike or
threat thereof, while negotiating renewal terms of agreement).
396. 29 U.S.C. § 163.
397. Id. § 157.
398. Dorchy v. Kansas, 272 U.S. 306, 311 (1926).
399. 29 U.S.C. §§ 151-69.
400. Cox ET AL., supra note 16, at 486-87.
401. Id. at 487.
402. Id.
403. Id.
404. General Indus. Employees Union v. NLRB, 951 F.2d 1308, 1311 (D.C. Cir.
1991).
405. Id.
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the strike.40 6 Economic strikes are those where the employees'
sole purpose is to bring economic pressure to bear upon the em-
ployer in an attempt to secure certain concessions in a collective
bargaining agreement.40 7
Additionally, the character of a strike may transform over
time, if the actual causes of the strike change. 40 8 Thus, a strike
that starts out as an economic strike, but which is prolonged by
the employer's subsequent unlawful conduct, is converted to an
unfair labor practice strike.4°9 Similarly, an unfair labor practice
strike may be converted to an economic strike where the illegal
conduct has been remedied, but the employees choose to re-
main on strike for economic reasons.41 °
To determine the character of a strike, the requisite causal
connection must be established.411 The NLRB has consistently
held that this requirement is not satisfied simply because a strike
coincides in time with an employer's unfair labor practice or
with the parties' contract negotiations. 412 Rather, the objective
and subjective evidence of the strikers' actual motivation, as de-
termined by the totality of the circumstances, is dispositive.41 3
2. Restrictions on the Right to Strike
The NLRA imposes upon an employee's right to strike cer-
tain time, place, and manner restrictions, 41 4 as well as a general
prohibition on "wrongful purpose" strikes.415 For example,
406. Id.
407. Id.
408. Id. at 1311-12.
409. Id.
410. Id. at 1312.
411. Id.
412. Id. "The Board has consistently held that '[t]he requirement of a causal con-
nection is not satisfied merely because [an unfair labor practice and a strike] coincide
in time.' " Id. "[A] n employer's unfair labor practices during an economic strike do
not ipso facto convert it into an unfair labor practice strike." Id.
413. Id.
414. See, e.g., 29 U.S.C. § 158(d). A party wishing to modify an already existing
collective bargaining agreement must serve written notice upon the other party con-
cerning the proposed modifications 60 days prior to the agreement's expiration date
and refrain from resorting to strikes or lockouts. Id. Any employee who engages in a
strike within any notice period specified in this subsection shall lose his status as an
employee under Sections 8, 9, and 10 of the NLRA. Id. §§ 8(d)(1)-(4)
415. Id. § 158(b) (4). A union commits an unfair labor practice when its members
engage in a strike or other concerted activity for the purpose of: a) forcing an em-
ployer to enter into an unlawful agreement; b) forcing any person to stop doing busi-
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under Section 8 (d) (4),416 employees are prohibited from engag-
ing in a strike during a statutorily mandated sixty day negotiating
period, where one of the parties has properly notified the other
of an intention to renew or modify the collective bargaining
agreement. 417 As well, striking employees who engage in actual
or threatened violence, at their place of employment, on the
picket line, or at the homes of fellow workers, fall outside the
protections of the NLRA.418 Furthermore, 'employees are not
.protected from employer self-help when their conduct during a
strike is so fundamentally contrary to the existence of the em-
ployment relationship that it may be accurately characterized as
indefensible, reprehensible, or disloyal. 419 Thus, unlike Ontario
Law, which limits an employee's right to strike to situations
where no collective agreement is in force,42 ° the NLRA grants
workers a broad right to strike. 421 The NLRA, however, does not
protect an employee's right to strike from what has become the
single most consequential restriction on the exercise of Section
7 rights - the right of employers to hire permanent replace-
ment workers.422
ness with any other person (secondary strikes), or forcing an employer to recognize or
bargain with a union which is not the certified representative of such employees; c)
forcing an employer to recognize or bargain with a union where another labor organi-
zation has already been certified as the employees representative; or d) forcing an em-
ployer to assign particular work to employees in one labor organization rather than to
another. Id.
416. Id. § 158(d).
417. Id.
418. Cox ET AL., supra note 16, at 547, 549.
419. Id. at 546; see NLRB v. Local 1229, 346 U.S. 464, 476-77 (1953). In Local 1229,
employees engaged in a labor dispute with their employer, Jefferson Standard Broad-
casting Co. Id. at 476. The employees were peacefully picketing outside the company's
place of operations. Id. In the course of picketing, a number of employees took it
upon themselves to pass out thousands of handbills containing virulent attacks on the
quality of the company's broadcasts. Id. These handbills did not refer to the union, the
labor dispute, or the ongoing collective bargaining negotiations. Id. The Supreme
Court held that such acts of disloyalty were as indefensible as acts of sabotage. Id. at
477.
420. R.S.O. ch. 21, § 74(1) (1992) (Can.).
421. See supra notes 394-414 and accompanying text (discussing right to strike
under NLRA).
422. See NLRB v. Mackay Radio & Telegraph Co., 304 U.S. 333 (1938) (finding
that employer not guilty of unfair labor practice may hire permanent replacement
workers).
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D. Replacement Worker Law in the United States
Antithetical to the Ontario Labour Relations Act, the NLRA
is silent as to whether employers have the legal right to hire re-
placement workers during a strike.423 In the absence of a Con-
gressional prohibition, the U.S. Supreme Court has intervened
and affirmed the existence of an employer's right to hire re-
placement workers during a strike.4 24 Through a trilogy of
landmark cases, NLRB v. Mackay Radio & Telegraph Co. ,42 5 NLRB
v. Fleetwood Trailer Co., Inc. ,426 and Mastro Plastics Corp. v.
NLRB,42 7 the U.S. Supreme Court has distinguished between
economic strikes and unfair labor practice strikes, conferring
upon employers and employees disparate rights and obligations,
contingent upon the type of strike involved.
1. Replacement Law During an Economic Strike
For almost sixty years, U.S. Supreme Court dicta428 from
Mackay Radio has driven the law regarding the use of replace-
ment workers during an economic strike. 2 9 The Court opined
that an employer who is the subject of an economic strike, and
who has not committed any unfair labor practices, may hire per-
manent replacement workers in order to maintain operations.3 °
Consequently, under Mackay Radio, once an employer hires per-
manent replacements, striking employees are stripped of their
right to immediate reinstatement upon the strike's conclu-
431
sion.
Mackay Radio involved a California corporation that was en-
gaged in the business of transmitting and receiving telegraph
and radio messages across the country and abroad.43 2 Following
numerous failed attempts to secure a collective bargaining
423. 29 U.S.C. §§ 151-69 (1988).
424. Mackay Radio, 304 U.S. at 345-46.
425. 304 U.S. 333 (1938).
426. 389 U.S. 375 (1967).
427. 350 U.S. 270 (1956).
428. See BLACK'S LAW DICaTONARY 454 (6th ed. 1990). Dicta is defined as expres-
sions in a court's opinion that are not essential to the determination of the case at
hand, and therefore not binding in subsequent cases as legal precedent. Id.
429. Mackay Radio, 304 U.S. at 345-46.
430. Id. at 345-46.
431. Id.
432. Id. at 336.
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agreement, the unionized employees called a strike.433 In order
to maintain operations, the employer brought in replacement
workers, to whom he promised permanent positions.4" When
the strike ended, shortly thereafter, five of the replacement
workers chose to stay on, prompting the employer to reinstate all
strikers except for the five most actively involved with the
union.433
These five workers filed unfair labor practice charges with
National Labor Relations Board, asserting that the employer had
discriminated against them due to their union involvement.43"
After a hearing, the NLRB concluded that the employer commit-
ted an unfair labor practice under Section 8(a) (1) of the Act43 7
by refusing to reinstate the five employees on the basis of union
membership and activity.43" The Board further held that the
employer violated Section 8(a) (3) of the Act 43 9 by failing to rein-
state the employees according to tenure of employment, thereby
discouraging membership in the local union. 4 0
On appeal, the U.S. Supreme Court affirmed the Board's
findings, and remanded the case for enforcement.441 Signifi-
cantly, in upholding the NLRB, the Court stated that an em-
ployer who has not committed an unfair labor practice may hire
permanent replacements for the striking employees. 4 2 This
433. Id. at 337.
434. Id. at 338.
435. Id. at 338-39.
436. Id. at 339.
437. 29 U.S.C. § 158(a) (1). Section 8(a) (1) states that it is an unfair labor practice
for an employer to interfere with, restrain, or coerce employees in the exercise of the
rights guaranteed in Section 7. Id. Section 7 guarantees workers the right to self-organ-
ization, to form, join, or assist labor organizations, to bargain collectively through rep-
resentatives of their own choosing, and to engage in other concerted activities for the
purpose of collective bargaining or other mutual aid or protection, and also the right to
refrain from such activity, except as required by an agreement under Section 8(a) (3).
29 U.S.C. § 157.
438. Mackay Radio, 304 U.S. at 340-41.
439. Id.; 29 U.S.C. § 158(a)(3).
440. Mackay Radio, 304 U.S. at 340-41. An employer who violates Section 8(a) (3)
of the NLRA is guilty of an unfair labor practice. 29 U.S.C. § 158(a) (3) (1988).
441. Id. at 350.
442. Id. at 345-46.
Nor was it an unfair labor practice to replace the striking employees with
others in an effort to carry on the business. Although section 13 of the act, 29
U.S.CA § 163, provides 'Nothing in this Act shall be construed so as to inter-
fere with or impede or diminish in any way the right to strike,' it does not
follow that an employer, guilty of no act denounced by the statute, has lost the
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dicta firmly established an employer's right to hire permanent
replacement workers during an economic strike, and thus
counter-balanced the right of employees to engage in concerted
activity for purposes of collective bargaining.
2. The Distinction Between Replacement and Dismissal
Under Section 2(3) of the NLRA, an individual, whose work
has ceased as a consequence of a current labor dispute," 3 or an
unfair labor practice, continues to be an employee if that indi-
vidual has not obtained regular and substantially equivalent em-
ployment. 4 Once a labor dispute has ended, striking employ-
ees are entitled to return to their former positions, unless the
employer can demonstrate legitimate and substantial business
justifications for denying reinstatement. 445 An employer who de-
nies reinstatement to employees at the conclusion of a strike in-
terferes with those employees' rights to organize and to strike
under Sections 7 and 13 of the Act, respectively. 446 Such inter-
ference is an unfair labor practice under both Sections 8(a) (1)
and 8(a) (3).447 .
In NLRB v. Fleetwood Trailer, Co., Inc., the U.S. Supreme
Court acknowledged two situations in which an employer would
have legitimate and substantial business justifications for deny-
right to protect and continue his business by supplying places left vacant by
strikers. And he is not bound to discharge those hired to fill the places of
strikers, upon the election of the latter to resume their employment, in order
to create places for them. The assurance by [the employer] to those who ac-
cepted employment during the strike that if they so desired their places might
be permanent was not an unfair labor practice, nor was it such to reinstate
only so many of the strikers as there were vacant places to be filled.
Id.
443. 29 U.S.C. § 152 (1988). Section 2(9) defines a labor dispute as "any contro-
versy concerning terms, tenure or conditions of employment, or concerning the associ-
ation or representation of persons in negotiating, fixing, maintaining, changing, or
seeking to arrange terms or conditions of employment, regardless of whether the dispu-
tants stand in proximate relation of employer and employee." Id.
444. Id. § 152(3).
445. NLRB v. Fleetwood Trailer Co., Inc., 389 U.S. 375, 378 (1967).
446. Id.
447. Id.
(1) It shall be an unfair labor practice for an employer - to interfere with,
restrain, or coerce employees in the exercise of the rights guaranteed in Sec-
tion 7; (3) by discrimination in regard to hire or tenure of employment or any
term or condition of employment to encourage or discourage membership in
any labor organization.
29 U.S.C. §§ 8(a)(1), (3).
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ing reinstatement to an employee.448 Relying on Mackay Ra-
dio," 9 the Court noted that an employer may deny reinstatement
where jobs claimed by economic strikers are occupied by perma-
nent replacements, hired during the strike in order to continue
operations.45 ° Moreover, the Court recognized that a second
justification could exist when a striker's job has been eliminated
for substantial and legitimate reasons, unrelated to labor rela-
tions, such as to improve efficiency or adapt to evolving business
conditions.45
Additionally, under Section 9(c) (3), economic strikers who
have been permanently replaced remain eligible to vote in any
election, regarding the bargaining unit or the union, conducted
within one year after commencement of the strike.45 This right
is significant in that strikers are afforded the opportunity to vote
in a possible decertification election, one that determines
whether those in the bargaining unit wish to retain the union as
their bargaining representative.45  The one-year limit on eligi-
bility, however, could potentially be hazardous for an incumbent
union whose members engage in an economic strike that out-
lasts the limit. Should this occur, the union could be faced with
a decertification vote, in which the only individuals voting are
the permanent replacement workers.454
3. Replacement Law During Unfair Labor Practice Strikes
Eighteen years after first announcing the right of employers
to hire replacement workers during an economic strike,45 5 the
U.S. Supreme Court, in Mastro Plastics Corp. v. NLRB, officially
extended that right to cover unfair labor practice strikes.456 Sig-
nificantly, the Mastro Court denied employers the right to hire
permanent replacements,45 7 in accordance with the Act.45 Con-
448. 389 U.S. at 379.
449. Mackay Radio, 304 U.S. at 345-46.
450. Fleetwood Trailer, 389 U.S. at 379.
451. Id.
452: 29 U.S.C. § 159(c) (3).
453. Id. § 159(c)(1)(A) (ii).
454. See id. In an election held after one year has expired, the striking employees
who have been permanently replaced no longer have voting rights. Id. Consequently,
the permanent replacements will be the only employees eligible to vote. Id.
455. NLRB v. Mackay Radio & Telegraph Co., 304 U.S. 333 (1938).
456. 350 U.S. 270, 278 (1956).
457. Id. at 278.
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sequently, the Court guaranteed reinstatement rights to unfair
labor practice strikers.45 9
In Mastro, an employee was discharged due to his organiza-
tional activities in support of a local union.4'50 In protest, sev-
enty-six fellow employees immediately went out on strike. 46' The
employer promptly responded to the strike and fired those in-
volved.462
Complicating matters, the parties' contract contained a no-
strike clause, 43 which required that the union refrain from all
strike activity during the life of the contract.' Just prior to the
strike, the employees had filed a request for modification of the
collective bargaining agreement, 465 pursuant to Section 8(d) of
the Act. 66 Consequently, the employees were striking during
the sixty-day notice period, 467 a time during which the Act pro-
hibits strikes.46
Examining the employer's conduct, the U.S. Supreme
Court upheld the NLRB's findings that the employer had wrong-
fully terminated all seventy-seven workers, in violation of Sec-
tions 8(a)(1) and 8(a)(3) of the NLRA.1 9  The employees'
strike, in protest of their employer's unfair labor practice, was
protected activity under the Act.470 Consequently, the Court
held that employees who engage in a lawful unfair labor practice
strike are entitled to reinstatement, even if the employer has
hired replacement workers.47 '
Regarding no-strike clauses, the Justices reasoned that in
458. See 29 U.S.C. § 160. Section 10(c) of the Act provides that a remedy for an
employer's unfair labor practice is for the Board to order reinstatement of employees,
with or without back-pay. Id.
459. Mastro Plastirs Corp. v. NLRB, 350 U.S. at 278.
460. Id. at 273.
461. Id. at 273-74.
462. Id. at 277.
463. Id.
464. Id. at 281. The "[ulnion further agrees to refrain from engaging in any strike
or work stoppage during the term of this agreement." Id.
465. Id. at 274.
466. 29 U.S.C. § 158(d) (2).
467. Mastro, 350 U.S. at 274.
468. 29 U.S.C. § 158(d)(1).
469. See Mastro, 350 U.S. at 273. The actual text of the case does not explicitly state
that the employer violated Sections 8(a) (1) and 8(a) (3). Id. The language that the
Court used, however, indicates that those sections were violated. Id.
470. Id. at 278.
471. Id.
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spite of the Act's strong policy against unfair labor practices,472
parties may lawfully agree to a prohibition on all strikes by exe-
cuting explicit contractual language to that effect.473 In the case
at bar, however, the Court narrowly construed the no-strike
clause to prohibit economic strikes during the life of the con-
tract, but not unfair labor practice strikes.4 74 According to the
majority's opinion, the exclusive economic nature of the con-
tract, coupled with the policy concerns of the Act, warranted
such a limited reading.
475
Similarly, the U.S. Supreme Court narrowly construed the
prohibition against strikes in Section 8(d) as pertaining only to
economic strikes, based both on the policy concerns of the Act,
and the legislative history.476 The Court believed that Congress
had intended to afford heightened protections to employees
subjected to unfair labor practices. 477 Looking to the Congres-
sional Record, the Court found support for such a conclusion.478
Consequently, the Court found that Congress could not have in-
tended that Section 8(d) be construed so as to deprive employ-
ees of the right to strike and protect themselves against unfair
labor practices.479
4. An Overview of Replacement Law in the United States
U.S. labor law prohibits an employer from firing employees
who are lawfully striking for either economic reasons or in pro-
test of an unfair labor practice.4 0 An employer, however, is per-
mitted to permanently replace economic strikers and refuse to
reinstate them to theirjobs once the strike ends.48' The right to
reinstatement once a position becomes available, and the right
to vote in a union election, conducted within a year after the
472. Id. at 279-80.
473. Id. at 278.
474. Id. at 284.
475. Id.
476. Id. at 284, 287-88.
477. Id. at 288-89.
478. S. REP. No. 573, 74th Cong., 1st Sess. 6-7 (1947). "[T]o hold that a worker
who because of an unfair labor practice has ... gone on strike is no longer [protected]
... would be to give legal sanction to an illegal act and to deny redress to the individual
injured thereby." Id.
479. Mastro, 350 U.S. at 289.
480. Mackay Radio, 304 U.S. at 345-46; Mastro, 350 U.S. at 278.
481. Mackay Radio, 304 U.S. at 345-46.
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commencement of a strike, constitute the distinction between
being permanently replaced and fired.482 While both economic
and unfair labor practice strikes may be lawful, the law confers
upon the parties involved disparate legal rights, dependent
solely upon the nature of the strike.48 Consequently, the nature
of a strike is critical, defining the limits of both an employer's
right to hire replacement workers and a striking employee's
right to reinstatement.484
5. The Controversy Over the Mackay Doctrine
Unions and employees are highly critical of the Mackay Doc-
trine, arguing that no justification exists for it and that the use of
permanent replacement workers is entirely inconsistent with the
language and purposes of the NLRA.485 While viewed by some
employers as a quick fix to labor problems, 486 the use of perma-
nent replacements adversely affects the duration of labor dis-
putes, more than tripling the average length of strikes.487 Fur-
thermore, critics of the Mackay Doctrine decry its uniqueness as
the only area in U.S. labor law where employees may lose their
job for engaging in protected activity.488
At the core of the Mackay Doctrine exists the presumption
that during an economic strike, the only way an employer will be
able to maintain operations is if that employer is allowed to hire
482. See supra notes 443-54 and accompanying text (discussing distinction between
replacement and dismissal).
483. NLRB v. Fleetwood Trailer Co., Inc., 389 U.S. 375 (1967); Mastro 350 U.S. at
270; Mackay Radio, 304 U.S. at 333.
484. Fleetwood Trailer, 389 U.S. at 375; Mastro, 350 U.S. at 270; Mackay Radio, 304
U.S. at 333.
485. Charles B. Craver, The National Labor Relations Act Must Be Revised To Preserve
Industrial Democracy, 34 Aiuz. L. RyV. 397 (1992);JackJ. Canzoneri, Comment, Manage-
ment's Attitudes and the Need for the Workplace Fairness Act, 41 BuFF. L. REv. 205, 228
(1993).
486. Samuel Estreicher, Labor Law in a World of Competitive Product Markets, 69 CHI.-
KENT L. REv. 3, 45 (1993).
487. William D. Turner, Restoring Balance to Collective Bargaining: Prohibiting Discrim-
ination Against Economic Strikers, 96 W. VA. L. REv. 685, 707 (1994). The average strike
lasts 27.26 days, while a strike in which the employer has hired permanent replacements
lasts 84.23 days. Id.
488. Turner, supra note 487, at 702. "The law pertaining to economic strikers
holds the dubious and inequitable distinction of being the only niche in the whole field
of labor and employment in which the employees may lose their job for engaging in
protected activity." Id.
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permanent, rather than temporary, replacement workers.489 Un-
ions have assailed this presumption, pointing out that an em-
ployer's ability to hire replacement workers is contingent on nu-
merous factors, which will vary depending on the circumstances
involved in each instance.49 ° Factors that may affect an owners'
ability to hire replacement workers include, but are not limited
to, the level of skill-required for the position, whether the busi-
ness is in a rural or urban area,49 and the economic state of the
relevant labor market.492
Some commentators have argued that without the lure of a
permanent position, an employer will be unable to fill jobs that
require a high degree of skill. 493  The current Major League
Baseball strike, however, illustrates that such a generalization
may be erroneous.494 Baseball is a highly specialized profession,
requiring skilled workers.495 Despite the skill requirement, how-
ever, the Owners were able to hire a full complement of replace-
ment workers, while only offering them temporary positions.4 96
Thus, the generalization that employers will only be able to hire
replacements if they offer permanent positions is not necessarily
489. Roukis & Farid, supra note 11, at 82. "[T]he federal courts and the NLRB
assume that an employer cannot continue its business during a strike unless it offers
replacements permanent positions." Id.; Canzoneri, supra note 485, at 228; contra
Mathew T. Golden, Note, On Replacing The Replacement Worker Doctrine, 25 COLUM.J.L. &
Soc. PROBS. 51, 69 (1991) (advocating that Mackay Doctrine is necessary for maintaining
labor balance).
490. Golden, supra note 489, at 69; William R. Corbett, Replacements: "A Far, Far
Better Thing" Than The Workplace Fairness Act, 72 N.C. L.' REV. 813, 872-75 (1994);
Canzoneri, supra note 485, at 228. "Contrary to this irrebuttable presumption, the em-
pirical evidence unequivocally demonstrates that an employer may adequately run its
operations during a strike with only temporary replacements." Id.
491. Golden, supra note 489, at 69.
492. See Corbett, supra note 490, at 872. The market theory argument suggests
that in an economic strike, the union will eventually prevail if the employer's proposal
is inadequate, as no outside sources of labor will accept replacement positions under
such terms. Id. Conversely, if the employer's proposal is a more accurate reflection of
the value of the labor force, third parties will accept replacement positions. Id. "Thus,
if the employer can attract permanent replacements sufficient in both quantity and
quality, the demands of the union are supracompetitive, and acceding to them proba-
bly would produce an inefficient result." Id. at 872-73.
493. See id. at 874 (explaining alleged need to hire permanent replacement work-
ers); Golden, supra note 489, at 69.
494. See Who Are Those Guys ?, supra note 9, § 8, at I (discussing replacement players
working for MLB teams).
495. See NrEc ET AL., supra note 40, at 6-11 (discussing difficulties and expertise
associated with MLB).
496. Waldie, supra note 1, § 1, at 10.
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accurate, even for highly skilled jobs.4 97
The most fundamental criticism of the Mackay Doctrine is the
assertion that it is inconsistent with the goals of the NLRA.4 98 In
enacting the NLRA, Congress believed that improved labor rela-
tions and industrial harmony could best be achieved by eliminat-
ing the inequality in bargaining power between employers and
employees.499 To achieve this balance of power, Congress
granted employees the right to strike under Section 13 of the
Act, 00 limited only by certain specific sections in the Act.5 1
Union advocates contend that the Mackay Doctrine disrupts that
balance by allowing employers to permanently replace lawfully
striking workers, thus undermining the right to strike.50 2
6. Recent Developments Regarding the Mackay Doctrine
In 1991, the United States House of Representatives
("House") passed the Workplace Fairness Bill, which would have
overturned the Mackay Doctrine, thereby prohibiting the use of
permanent replacement workers.50 3 By passing the Bill, the
House sought to amend Section 8(a) of the NLRA, making the
permanent replacement of workers, or the threat thereof, an un-
fair labor practice.50 4 The Workplace Fairness Bill, however, was
497. See Who Are Those Guys?, supra note 9, § 8, at 1 (discussing replacement players
working for MLB teams).
498. Canzoneri, supra note 485, at 213-16; Craver, supra note 485, at 421.
499. 29 U.S.C. § 151.
The inequality in bargaining power between employees who do not posses full
freedom of association or actual liberty of contract, and employers who are
organized in the corporate or other forms of ownership association substan-
tially burdens and affects the flow of commerce, and tends to aggravate recur-
rent business depressions, by depressing wage rates and the purchasing power
of wage earners in industry and by preventing the stabilization of competitive
wage rates and working conditions within and between industries.
Id.
500. Id. § 163.
501. Id. "Nothing in this Act, except as specifically provided for herein, shall be
construed so as either to interfere with or impede or diminish in any way the right to
strike, or to affect the limitations or qualifications on that right." Id.; see supra notes
393-403 and accompanying text (discussing right to strike in United States).
502. Canzoneri, supra note 485, at 213-16; Craver, supra note 485, at 421.
503. H.R. 5, 102nd Cong., 1st Sess. (1991).
504. H.R. 5. Under the Workplace Fairness Bill, Section 8(a) (6) would be created,
making it an unfair labor practice for an employer "to promise, to threaten, or to take
any action - to hire a permanent replacement for an employee who" was lawfully
striking. Id.
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not enacted into law, as the U.S. Senate failed to approve it.505
Although certain polls have indicated that a majority of U.S. citi-
zens favored the legislation, supporters of the Bill were nonethe-
less unable to overcome strong Republican and business opposi-
tion.50 6
Almost three years later, on March 8, 1995, U.S. President
Bill Clinton did what Congress had been unable to do, issuing an
Executive Order (or "Order") that undermines the ability of em-
ployers to hire permanent replacements." 7 Under the Presi-
dent's directive, entitled Ensuring the Economical and Efficient Ad-
ministration and Completion of Federal Government Contracts, the fed-
eral government will not contract with employers that
permanently replace lawfully striking workers. 5°8 The Executive
Order empowers the Secretary of Labor ("Secretary") to investi-
gate all employers that contract with the federal government to
determine whether such employers permanently replace lawfully
striking employees. 5°9 If the Secretary discovers that an em-
ployer has utilized permanent replacements, the Secretary may
terminate any existing contracts with that employer 5 10 bar that
employer from receiving new Federal contracts until the labor
505. Senate Vote Kills Bill To Restrict Use of Permanent Striker Replacements, 117 Daily
Lab. Rep. (BNA) at A-9 (June 17, 1992) [hereinafter Senate Vote Kills Bill]. Under Sen-
ate procedural rules, the Senate had to vote on whether to bring the bill to a vote. Id.
Sixty votes in favor of the bill were required. Id. Supporters of the bill fell three votes
shy, 57-42, "effectively killing the bill." Id.
506. Id. In 1993, the House passed for a second time the Workplace Fairness Bill.
Negotiators for Management and Labor Gauge Impact of Striker Replacements, 247 Daily Lab.
Rep. (BNA) at D-15 (Dec. 29, 1993) [hereinafter Impact of Striker Replacements]. The
Senate, however, has yet to act on the measure. Id.; see S. 55, 103rd Cong., 1st Sess.
(1993) (delineating bill to amend NLRA by making permanent replacement of workers
unfair labor practice).
507. Striker Replacements: President Issues Order Barring Permanent Replacement of Strik-
ers, 46 Daily Lab. Rep. (BNA) at D-3 (Mar. 9, 1995) [hereinafter Striker Replacements].
508. Exec. Order No. 12,954, 60 Fed. Reg. 13,023 (1995), reprinted in 46 Daily Lab.
Rep. (BNA) at D-28 (Mar. 9, 1995). "It is the policy of the executive branch in procur-
ing goods and services that, to ensure the economical and efficient administration and
completion of Federal Government contracts, contracting agencies shall not contract
with employers that permanently replace lawfully striking employees." Id. § 1, 60 Fed.
Reg. at 13,023, 46 Daily Lab. Rep. (BNA) at D-28.
509. Id. § 2, 60 Fed. Reg. at 13,023, 46 Daily Lab. Rep. (BNA) at D-28.
510. Id. "When the Secretary determines that a contractor has permanently re-
placed lawfully striking employees, the Secretary may make a finding that it is appropri-
ate to terminate the contract for convenience." Id. § 3(a), 60 Fed. Reg. at 13,023, 46
Daily Lab. Rep. (BNA) at D-28. The federal agency which has contracted with such an
employer may object to the termination of the contract, in which case the contract will
not be terminated. Id. § 3(B), 60 Fed. Reg. at 13,024, 46 Daily Lab. Rep. (BNA) at D-28.
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dispute that precipitated the use of permanent replacements has
been resolved,511 and publish in the Federal Register the names
of contractors that do not comply with the Order.51 2
The primary purpose of the Executive Order, which will
cover 28,000 contractors that do business with the Federal Gov-
ernment,51 is to assist the development of stable labor relations
between federal contractors and their employees.514 According
to the Order, the use of permanent replacements disrupts the
balance of power between allowing an employer to operate dur-
ing a strike and preserving the integrity of an employee's right to
strike.515 Furthermore, the use of permanent replacement work-
ers adversely affects the Federal Government's efficiency and
cost of operations, as the accumulated knowledge, skill, and ex-
perience of the striking employees are forever lost.
51 6
While organized labor praised the Executive Order, busi-
ness leaders and U.S. Senate Majority Leader Bob Dole [R-Kan.]
severely criticized the President's action.517 The Republican
leader Dole argued that President Clinton had usurped the legis-
lative powers of the U.S. Congress, 518 and vowed to overturn the
511. Id. § 4(c), 60 Fed. Reg. at 13,024, 46 Daily Lab. Rep. (BNA) at D-28.
512. Id. § 5, 60 Fed. Reg. at 13,024, 46 Daily Lab. Rep. (BNA) at D-28.
513. Striker Replacements, supra note 507, at D-3.
514. Exec. Order No. 12,954, 60 Fed. Reg. at 13,023, 46 Daily Lab. Rep. (BNA) at
D-28.
515. Id.
An important aspect of a stable collective bargaining relationship is the bal-
ance between allowing businesses to operate during a strike and preserving
worker rights. This balance is disrupted when permanent replacement em-
ployees are hired. It has been found that strikes involving permanent replace-
ment workers are longer in duration than other strikes. In addition, the use of
permanent replacements can change a limited dispute into a broader, more
contentious struggle, thereby exacerbating the problems that initially led to
the strike.
Id.
516. Id. These circumstances reduce the quality and reliability of the goods and
services for which the Federal Government contracts. Id.
517. Striker Replacements: Executive Order Denounced by Business, Defended by Labor, 46
Daily Lab. Rep. (BNA) at D-5 (Mar. 9, 1995) [hereinafter Executive Order Denounced].
Lane Kirkland, the President of the American Federation of Labor - Congress of In-
ternational Organizations, called the Order "a welcome step towards justice in the work-
place." Id. A business lobby, the Alliance to Keep America Working, declared that the
"[Order) will result in greater labor unrest and greater costs for taxpayers." Id.
518. Id.; Jerry Gray, G.O.P. in Senate Bows to Minority on Striker Issue, N.Y. TMES,
Mar. 16, 1995, at Al [hereinafter G.O.P. Bows to Minority].
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Executive Order through congressional action.519 One week af-
ter President Clinton issued the Executive Order, Senator Dole,
however, abandoned his efforts, conceding that he could not
gather enough support from his fellow Senators to overturn the
Executive Order.52 0 Having withstood congressional attack,
52 1
President Clinton's Executive Order pierced the Mackay Doc-
trine,5 2 undercutting its validity almost sixty years after the U.S.
Supreme Court granted employers the legal right to hire perma-
nent replacement workers during an economic strike.525
III. THE PROVINCE OF ONTARIO AND THE UNTED STATES
SHOULD EACH ADOPT THE INTERNATIONAL LABOUR
ORGANISATION'S STANDARD REGARDING
REPLACEMENT WORKERS
The 1994-1995 Major League Baseball strike illustrates that
while Ontario law unduly interferes with an employer's right to
maintain operations during a strike,524 U.S. law under the Mac-
kay Doctrine discriminates against workers who lawfully exercise
the right to strike.525 The International Labour Organisation,
through the CFA, has carved out a replacement law doctrine that
strikes a middle ground between Ontario and U.S. Law.5 26 This
ILO standard preserves the integrity of the right to strike without
sacrificing an employer's compelling right to maintain business
operations.52 7 Consequently, Ontario and the United States
should adopt the ILO standard as it best achieves the intended
goals of both the Ontario Labour Relations Act and the
519. G.O.P. Bows to Minority, supra note 518, at Al.
520. Id.
521. Id.
522. NLRB v. Mackay Radio & Telegraph Co., 304 U.S. 333 (1938).
523. Striker Rplacements, supra note 507, at D-3; Exec. Order No. 12,954, 60 Fed.
Reg. 13,023 (1995), reprinted in 46 Daily Lab. Rep. (BNA) at D-28, (Mar. 9, 1995).
524. R.S.O., ch. 21, § 73.1 (1992) (Can.) (instituting complete prohibition on use
of replacement workers).
525. Mackay Radio, 304 U.S. at 345 (authorizing use of permanent replacement
workers for employees who lawfully exercise right to strike).
526. Complaint Against the Government of the United States Presented by the
American Federation of Labor and Congress of Industrial Organizations (AFL-CIO),
Case No. 1543, 74 INT'L LAB. OFF. OFF'L BuLL. 15, 27 (CFA 278th Rep. 1991) (asserting
that permanent replacement of workers who legally strike is derogation of fundamental
right to strike) (emphasis added).
527. See supra notes 255-82 and accompanying text (discussing limitations on right
to strike and prohibitions against permanent replacement workers).
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NLRA.52
8
A. The Baseball Strike Under Ontario Law
Under the relevant provisions of the Ontario Act,529 the
Players were eligible to strike on August 12, 1994, as there was no
longer a collective agreement in operation.3 ° Pursuant to Sec-
tion 74(2) of the Ontario Act,5 31 the Minister of Labour assigned
a conciliation officer, who advised both the Owners and the Play-
ers' Association that he would not appoint a conciliation
board.5"' The parties received notification of this decision on or
about July 28, 1994.5 33 Consequently, the strike, which the Play-
ers initiated on August 12, satisfied the statutorily mandated
fourteen-day waiting period.5 "
1. Ontario Voting Requirements and the Baseball Strike
According to statistics released by the Players' Association,
among the twenty-eight teams, there were only six votes cast
against the strike." 5 While the players on the Toronto Blue Jays
voted unanimously in favor of the strike,5 36 only twenty-five of
the forty players listed on the official roster actually cast bal-
lots.5 37  This' voting discrepancy, if a league-wide occurrence,
could potentially have provided the Owners with a ground upon
which to challenge the legality of the vote under Ontario law. 5 8
528. See supra notes 374-75 and accompanying text (discussing goal of partnership
between labor and management); see 29 U.S.C. § 151 (expressing U.S. congressional
desire to improve equality of bargaining power between employers and employees).
529. R.S.O., ch. 21, §§ 74, 76.
530. Baseball '94: Going, Going... Gone, supra note 2, at C7. The former CBA
expired on December 31, 1993. Id.
531. R.S.O., ch. 21, § 74(2).
532. Telephone Interview with Patti Hannigan, Policy Adviser, supra note 392.
533. Id.
534. R.S.O., ch. 21, § 74(2)(b).
535. Larry Whiteside, No Progress So Players Will Set a Strike Date Today, BOSTON
GLOBE, July 28, 1994, at 63.
536. Tim Harper &Jim Byers, Cox Is In, Green Out forJays, TORONTO STAR,July 10,
1994, at E3.
537. Waldie, supra note 1, at 10. The twenty-five players who voted were those cur-
rently playing with the team at the major league level. Id.
538. R.S.O., ch. 21, § 75(5) (6). If all players listed on the roster were not afforded
ample opportunity to vote, then the voting procedure may have been in violation of
Section 75(5) (6). Id. The requirement that at least 60% of those eligible to vote ap-
prove the strike is satisfied even if only 25 players on each team voted. Id. § 73.1(2) (3).
With only six votes cast against the strike, the approval percentage equals 61.9%. Id.
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The owner of the Blue Jays, however, declined to challenge the
validity of the vote.53 9
As the Owners have not challenged the legality of the strike
vote, the Toronto Blue Jays were in a legal strike position and
thus prohibited from hiring persons to serve as replacement
players.54 ° Under the Ontario Act, the BlueJays could have tried
to field a replacement team consisting of the team's manager,
coaches, and any other managerial or confidential employees."4'
The team, however, instead took advantage of the industry's am-
bulatory nature, and moved its operations to Dunedin, Florida,
the location of its spring training facility.54 Ontario law is not
extraterritorial.5 4 Consequently, the Province's statutory ban
on replacements workers was not applicable to the Blue Jays as
long as the team remained outside of Ontario. 5" By temporarily
relocating to Florida, the Toronto Blue Jays successfully circum-
vented Ontario's prohibition on replacement workers.5 5
B. The Baseball Strike Under U.S. Law
The MLB labor dispute began as an economic strike, involv-
ing issues primarily linked to wage compensation.5 ' The Own-
ers, however, on several occasions, engaged in suspect behavior,
arousing suspicions that they were not bargaining with the Play-
ers' Association in good faith.54 7 As is evidenced by the multiple
complaints issued by the NLRB, the Owners apparently failed to
bargain in good faith.5 4 8
In February 1995, the Owners' unilaterally eliminated salary
539. Waldie, supra note 1, at 10.
540. Id. § 73.1(5).
541. Id. § 73.1(6). Managerial and confidential employees have the legal right to
refuse to perform work ordinarily done by the striking players. Id. § 73.1(7). The On-
tario Act guarantees this right by shielding managerial and confidential employees
from threats, coercion, and discrimination from the employer due to a refusal to per-
form the work of the striking employees. Id.
542. Baseball4 Here They Come, the Dunedin BlueJays, LA TIMES, Mar. 18, 1995, at
C12 [hereinafter Dunedin BlueJays].
543. Telephone Interview with Patti Hannigan, Policy Adviser, supra note 392.
544. Id.
545. Dunedin BlueJays, supra note 542, at C12.
546. See supra notes 12-15, 85-110 (discussing labor dispute between Owners and
Players).
547. See supra notes 124-47 and accompanying text (reviewing Owners' suspected
failure to bargain in good faith).
548. See id. (discussing unfair labor practice charges filed against Owners).
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arbitration and implemented a hiring freeze regarding all un-
signed players. 4 9 These actions are unfair labor practices under
Section 8(a) (5) of the NLRA, violating the duty to bargain col-
lectively, and in good faith, over wages, hours, and other terms
and conditions of employment. 5 0 The U.S. Supreme Court has
consistently held that a unilateral change of an existing term of
contained in an expired CBA, before impasse is reached, is an
unfair labor practice.551 The Owners and Players' Association
never reached an impasse in their negotiations. 52 Because the
elimination of salary arbitration and individual bargaining for
free agents is a unilateral change of terms that affect Players'
wages, the Owners committed an unfair labor practice, thereby
converting the MLB labor dispute into an unfair labor practice
strike.553
If indeed the dispute was an unfair labor practice strike, the
Owners were prohibited from hiring permanent replacement
workers.5 54 In reality, even if the strike were an economic strike,
the Owners would not have hired permanent replacements due
to the total absence of a competently-skilled labor pool. 55 5 Still,
549. Donald Fehr, Backtalk - Major Beleaguered Baseball The Principals in Their
Words; All Compromise Came from the Players, N.Y. TIMS, Feb. 12, 1995, § 8, at 9.
On Feb. 5, [the Owners] announced that individual clubs could no longer
sign players to contracts; this would be done centrally by a bargaining commit-
tee. On Feb. 9 the clubs announced there would no longer be any salary arbi-
tration. And the clubs said they were unilaterally eliminating the anti-collu-
sion provision that had been in effect since 1976.
Id.
550. 29 U.S.C. §§ 158(a) (5), (d); NLRB v. Katz, 369 U.S. 736, 742-43 (1962) (de-
claring unilateral change of existing term or condition of employment in expired col-
lective bargaining agreement to be unfair labor practice under § 8(a) (5)).
551. NLRB v. Katz, 369 U.S. 736, 742-43 (1962); Litton Fin. Printing Div. v. NLRB,
501 U.S. 190, 198 (1991). "[A]n employer commits an unfair labor practice if, without
bargaining to impasse, it effects a unilateral change of an existing term or condition of
employment." Id. This doctrine extends to situations where "an existing agreement
has expired and negotiations on a new one have yet to be completed." Id. The prohibi-
tion applies to all mandatory subjects of bargaining. Id. A mandatory subject of bar-
gaining is one which affects wages, hours, or other terms and conditions of employ-
ment. Id. at 198-99.
552. See supra notes 132-36 and accompanying text (discussing Owners' withdrawal
of an untimely declaration of impasse).
553. Id.; see supra notes 404-13 and accompanying text (discussing conversion of
labor dispute from economic to unfair labor practice strike).
554. See supra notes 455-79 and accompanying text (discussing use of temporary
replacement workers).
555. See Peter T. Kilborn, Bittersweet Success; the Failure of Replacement Baseball Is a
Labor Vi toiy, and an Exception, N.Y. TiMES, Apr. 4, 1995, at A16 (discussing effect of
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the strike does serve as a gauge for measuring the deficiency in
U.S. labor law for allowing the permanent replacement of work-
ers.
The Owners have been obligated, since the collective bar-
gaining negotiations began, to continue to bargain in good faith
over the disputed economic issues.556 Had the Owners perma-
nently replaced the Players, the only remaining issues to bargain
over would be such areas as termination pay and reinstatement
order if and when positions become available. The ability to em-
ploy only temporary replacement workers thus forces an em-
ployer to comply with Section 8(d) of the NLRA55 7 and make a
concerted effort to settle a labor dispute. With this obligation in
place, economic forces may take control and bring about a set-
tlement that accurately reflects the legitimacy of each side's pro-
posals. 58
C. Both the United States and the Province of Ontario Should Amend
Their Respective Labor Laws and Adopt the ILO Standard Regarding
the Use of Replacement Workers
The ILO has articulated that employees possess a funda-
permanent replacements on labor movement and right to strike) [hereinafter Bittersweet
Success]. Thomas Geoghegan, a labor law attorney and author of numerous articles and
a book regarding labor law issues, maintains that "[tihe message here is that you have
to have a unique set of skills .... It's odd,,surreal, being in a situation where only this
elite group of ballplayers can engage in a right [the right to strike] that should be
everybody's." Id.
Few workers are so skilled that management cannot find others who can take
their job right away or after a few months of training. Today only professional
athletes and a few other union groups like orchestra musicians, airline pilots
and machinists - among the most skilled factory workers - can call the bluff
of employers who threaten permanent replacement.
Id.
556. See 29 U.S.C. § 158(d).
[T] o bargain collectively is the performance of the mutual obligation of the em-
ployer and the representative of the employees to meet at reasonable times and con-
fer in good faith with respect to wages, hours, and other terms and conditions
of employment... but such obligation does not compel either party to agree
to a proposal or require the making of a concession.
Id. (emphasis added).
557. Id.
558. See supra notes 16-03 and accompanying text (explaining effect of economic
forces on labor negotiations); see Bittersweet Success, supra note 555, at A16. "Now .... in
baseball at least, the playing field is level and the old processes of collective bargaining
can resume. Negotiators who throughout the strike have postured to television cameras
can now talk face to face." Id.
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mental right to strike, which necessarily encompasses the corol-
lary right to return to work once a strike has ended.55 9 Conse-
quently, the practice of permanently replacing lawfully striking
employees is incompatible with ILO standards.5" While the ILO
has yet to comment directly on the use of temporary replace-
ments, the CFA has pronounced that it is an employer's ability to
hire permanent replacement workers that renders the use of
replacements problematic.5 61
Additionally, the ILO was founded upon the principle that
improved labor relations, achieved through a partnership of la-
bor and management, would help ensure social harmony." 2
The belief in the partnership is carried out through the tri-par-
tite structure of the ILO, which seeks to establish international
labor standards based on a consensus agreement involving both
workers and employers.5 63 Thus, the use of temporary replace-
ment workers is entirely consistent with the very basis of the ILO,
which seeks to balance the rights of both labor and manage-
ment.
1. Ontario Law
Ontario's comprehensive ban on the use of replacement
workers during a lawful strike fails to achieve the balance sought
by the ILO by not protecting an employer's basic right to main-
tain operations."' The Toronto Blue Jays were able to tempo-
rarily relocate for the duration of the strike, and thus avoid the
prohibition against replacement workers.5 65 Most businesses,
559. See COMMITTEE OF EXPERTS, supra note 252, at 76-78 (discussing impermissible
effect permanent replacements have on right to strike).
560. Id.
561. See supra notes 276-82 and accompanying text (explaining that use of replace-
ments for indefinite period severely interferes with right to strike).
562. See supra notes 157-69 and accompanying text (discussing structure and goals
of ILO); ILO CONST. pmbl., art. 1(1), 62 Stat. at 3490-92, 15 U.N.T.S. at 40-42; PHILA-
DELPHiA DECLARATION art. III(e), 62 Stat. at 3558-60, 15 U.N.T.S. at 108. "[T]he effec-
tive recognition of the right of collective bargaining, the co-operation of management and
labour in the continuous improvement of productive efficiency, and the collaboration of
workers and employers in the preparation and application of social and economic meas-
ures." Id.
563. See supra notes 157-69 and accompanying text (discussing structure and goals
of ILO).
564. See supra notes 333-45 and accompanying text (discussing Ontario's sweeping
prohibition on use of replacements).
565. See supra notes 540-45 and accompanying text (discussing Blue Jay's ability to
move operations during strike).
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however, when faced with a strike, will not have the ability to
relocate in order to maintain operations. The Blue Jays' ability
to relocate was a function solely of the ambulatory nature of the
industry, which ordinarily involves operating at the various cities
throughout MLB.
Consequently, Ontario's ban on replacement workers, insti-
tuted to encourage labor-management co-operation, unnecessa-
rily assumes that unions will not abuse their power to strike,
thereby closing down an employer.566 As the ILO has empha-
sized, the evil that must be avoided when replacement workers
are involved in a labor dispute is the threat or actual use of per-
manent replacements.567 Just as the U.S. practice of using per-
manent replacement workers swings the balance of power
strongly in favor of employers, granting them the ability to break
a union, the complete prohibition on replacement workers po-
tentially empowers unions and employees to act recklessly and
impose potentially deleterious financial demands upon an em-
ployer.5 68 The use of temporary replacements, however, elimi-
nates both of these concerns, acting as a check against both
voracious Owners and imprudent striking employees.
2. U.S. Law
The fundamental purpose of the National Labor Relations
Act is to diminish the ability of both employers and unions to
disrupt the free flow of commerce in the United States.5 69 The
566. Job Creator or Job Killer?, supra note 374, at A19.
567. See supra notes 266-82 and accompanying text (discussing problem of perma-
nent replacement workers).
568. See Roukis & Farid, supra note 11, at 86-91 (discussing how both use of perma-
nent replacements and unreasonable bargaining positions may be used as destructive
economic weapons). One study found that in situations in which employers hired per-
manent replacement workers, unions failed to survive the strike in 40% of the cases. Id.
at 86.
569. See 29 U.S.C. § 151.
The denial by some employers of the right of employees to organize and the
refusal by some employers to accept the procedure of collective bargaining
lead to strikes and other forms of industrial strife and unrest, which have the
intent or the necessary effect of burdening or obstructing commerce ....
[C]ertain practices by some labor organizations, their officers, and members
have the intent or necessary effect of burdening or obstructing commerce by
preventing the free flow of goods in such commerce through strikes and other
forms of industrial unrest .... The elimination of such practices is a necessary
condition to the assurance of the rights herein contained.
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Act endeavors to protect the flow of commerce by equalizing
bargaining power between employees and employers, thereby
levelling the collective bargaining playing field.57° The use of
permanent replacement workers during an economic strike up-
sets this balance of power, contrary to the intent of the NLRA.
571
While economic strikers do retain certain rights under the Act
after an employer has permanently replaced them, the Supreme
Court was splitting hairs in 1938 when it announced the Mackay
Doctrine. In reality, there is no practical difference between be-
ing permanently replaced and fired. Both situations leave the
employee without a job. Consequently, the legality of perma-
nent replacements effectively denies an employee of his or her
right to strike in support of an economic agenda.
5 71
The United States, which already sanctions the use of tem-
porary replacement workers, should adopt the Workplace Fair-
ness Act,5 73 or similar legislation, and ban the use of permanent
replacement workers. 74 The U.S. Congress must recognize that
the Supreme Court enunciated the Mackay Doctrine during the
height of the Great Depression, a time that acutely influenced
570. Id.
Experience has proved that protection by law of the right of employees to
organize and bargain collectively safeguards commerce from injury, impair-
ment, or interruption, and promotes the flow of commerce by removing cer-
tain recognized sources of industrial strife and unrest, by encouraging prac-
tices fundamental to the friendly adjustment of industrial disputes arising out
of differences as to wages, hours, and other working conditions, and by restor-
ing equality of bargaining power between employers and employees.
Id.
571. See supra note 499 and accompanying text (discussing goal of NLRA to elimi-
nate inequality of bargaining power and realize full freedom of association for employ-
ees).
572. See Bitterswet Succes, supra note 555, at A16.
In many other labor disputes of recent years, the mere threat of permanent
replacements has blunted the spirit of the fight. Workers have stayed on the
job and settled for less than they otherwise would have, a factor that has con-
tributed to a decline in wages for most workers for two decades and has
helped employers chip away at pensions and health benefits. Unions, unable
to assuage their fears, have seen membership levels plunge, and organized
labor now represents just 11.2 percent of private-sector workers, less than half
what the figure was during labor's heyday in the 1950's.
Id.
573. See supra notes 503-06 and accompanying text (discussing the Workplace Fair-
ness Act).
574. See supra notes 503-23 and accompanying text (discussing recent develop-
ments regarding Mackay Doctrine).
2094 FORDHAM17NTERNATIONAL LAWJOURNTAL
the acts of both the judiciary and the legislature. After almost
sixty years under the Mackay Doctrine, the United States should
eradicate the lawful use of permanent 'replacement workers and
thereby harmonize the NLRA with the standards of the Interna-
tional Labour Organisation." 5
CONCLUSION
The stated goals of the International Labour Organisation,
the Ontario Labour Relations Act, and the National Labor Rela-
tions Act all indicate a desire to improve labor standards by bal-
ancing the rights of both employers and workers, thereby level-
ing the collective bargaining playing field. The practice in the
United States of allowing employers to permanently replace law-
fully striking economic workers destroys this balance, diluting
the right to strike. Conversely, Ontario's statutory ban on the
use of even temporary replacement workers grants employees an
unchecked power to force upon an employer potentially unrea-
sonable economic demands. A compromise between U.S. law
and Ontario law, such as the ILO sanction of temporary replace-
ment workers, would restore balance to the collective bargaining
process and allow workers and employers to conclude agree-
ments that more accurately reflect the market value of a busi-
ness' employment and a worker's labor.
575. See Roukis & Farid, supra note 11, at 88. The United States is the only West-
ern ITidustrialized Country that permits the use of permanent replacement workers. Id.
